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EVOLUTION OF PREFERENCES IN MULTIPLE POPULATIONS
YU-SUNG TU AND WEI-TORNG JUANG
Abstract. We study the evolution of preferences and the behavioral out-
comes in an n-population setting. Each player has subjective preferences over
potential outcomes, and chooses a best response based on his preferences and
the information about the opponents’ preferences. However, players’ actual
fitnesses are defined by material payoff functions. Players can observe their
opponents’ preferences with some fixed probability p. We derive necessary
and sufficient conditions for stability for p = 1 and p = 0. We also check
the robustness of these results against small perturbations in p for the case of
pure-strategy outcomes.
1. Introduction
The indirect evolutionary approach is a model for studying the evolution of pref-
erences. In this setting, players choose strategies to maximize their subjective
preferences rather than playing pre-programmed strategies, but they receive the
actual fitnesses defined by material payoff functions which may be distinct from
their preferences. Eventually, evolutionary selection is driven by differences in fit-
ness values. We can think that evolutionary processes shape behavior through the
effects on players’ preferences.
This evolutionary approach can be used to explain how behavior appearing in-
consistent with material self-interest, such as altruism, vengeance, punishment, fair-
ness, and reciprocity, may be evolutionarily stable. 1 In the indirect evolutionary
approach literature, almost every concept of static stability is built on a symmetric
two-player game played by a single population of players without identifying their
positions. 2 However, it is a common phenomenon that players know exactly what
their roles are in strategic interactions. For example, they may be males and fe-
males, buyers and sellers, employers and employees, or parents and their children.
In this paper, we investigate the case of separate populations within the framework
of the indirect evolutionary approach: players drawn from different populations
may have different action sets and different material payoff functions; every player
knows his position and has personal preferences over potential outcomes.
In a standard evolutionary game theoretic model where players are programmed
to adopt some strategies, there are two quite different ways of extending the def-
inition of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) from a single-population setting
to a multi-population setting. 3 The multi-population stability criterion suggested
by Taylor (1979) is based on average fitness values aggregated over all player posi-
tions. Such a criterion may be particularly appropriate for coevolutionary games.
Key words and phrases. Preference evolution, asymmetric game, stability, observability.
1See, for example, Gu¨th and Yaari (1992), Gu¨th (1995), Bester and Gu¨th (1998),
Huck and Oechssler (1999), and Ostrom (2000).
2Although von Widekind (2008, p. 61) gives a definition of stability for two-population models,
he only shows some illustrative examples rather than a general study.
3Maynard Smith and Price (1973) introduced the concept of an ESS for a symmetric two-player
game.
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Cressman (1992) introduces a seemingly weaker criterion for multi-population evo-
lutionary stability: the stability is ensured if new entrants earn less in at least one
population. Indeed, it can be shown that both criteria are equivalent to the follow-
ing one: for any n-player game, a strategy profile is evolutionarily stable if and only
if it is a strict Nash equilibrium. 4 Therefore, the extension of the ESS concept
to multiple populations is quite restrictive. However, unlike those of evolutionarily
stable strategy profiles, we show that the properties of multi-population stability
underlying the indirect evolutionary approach with complete information will de-
pend on which stability concept is adopted, and on how many populations are
considered. Some of the arguments we discuss in this paper will help us understand
how multiple populations interact with one another in such an environment.
Dekel et al. (2007) use the indirect evolutionary approach to study endogenous
preferences in a single-population setting. This study offers two methodological
contributions to the work on the evolution of preferences, namely that all possible
preferences are allowed, and that various degrees of observability are considered. 5
To extend the static stability criterion based on the indirect evolutionary approach
for multi-population interactions, we apply the concept of a two-species ESS in-
troduced in Cressman (1992) to the model of Dekel et al. (2007). Remarkably, the
objective game, whose entries represent the actual fitnesses, may be either sym-
metric or asymmetric when focusing on the multi-population cases. Even if the
objective game is symmetric, the stable outcomes may still be different because,
unlike interactions in a single-population setting, here a preference type never plays
against himself.
We suppose that there are n large populations, which may be polymorphic, mean-
ing that not all individuals in a population have the same preferences. In any match
of n players drawn from the separate populations, one for each player position, an
equilibrium is played to maximize their preferences based on the information about
the opponents. If one preference type receives the highest average fitness in the
population, this type will prevail, that is, the population evolves. Naturally, the
stability criterion is developed for a configuration, which consists of a distribution of
preferences in n populations and an equilibrium determining what strategies should
be adopted. If a configuration is resistant to invasion by rare mutants, it should
have the characteristics: after introduction of a mutant profile, every incumbent
will not be wiped out and the post-entry equilibrium behavior gets arbitrarily close
to the pre-entry one if the population shares of the mutants are sufficiently small.
Our multi-population stability is defined for any degree of observability, as in
Dekel et al. (2007), with which equilibrium behavior is definitely determined. We
begin by studying two extreme cases: in one each player can observe the oppo-
nents’ preference types, and in the other each player knows only the distribution of
opponents’ types. We then consider intermediate cases to investigate the robust-
ness of the results of the two extreme case studies. Because all possible preferences
are considered and a lot of preference relations may induce the same best-response
4Selten (1980) applies the ESS concept to asymmetric two-player games, for which each indi-
vidual is randomly assigned a player role. It turns out that a strategy in the symmetrized game is
an ESS if and only if the associated strategy pair is a strict Nash equilibrium of the asymmetric
game. Thus, those two-species definitions followed from Taylor (1979) and Cressman (1992) are all
equivalent to this role-conditioned single-population definition; see Swinkels (1992) and Weibull
(1995, p. 167).
5Samuelson (2001) regards the indirect evolutionary approach as incomplete, since only a few
possible preferences are considered for applications in some special games, and those new results
always rely on the assumption that preferences are perfectly observable.
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correspondence, we are interested in the evolutionarily viable outcome rather than
the emergence of one particular preference type.
Under the assumption that preferences are observable, the key feature of the
indirect evolutionary approach is that players can adjust their strategies according
to specific opponents. Since we allow for all possible preferences to compete, such
adjustments made based on preferences can lead to Pareto improvements in fitness
outcomes: an inefficient outcome will be destabilized by entrants having the “secret
handshake” flavour, which refer to the appropriate mutants playing the inefficient
outcome when matched against the incumbents and attaining a more efficient out-
come when matched against themselves. 6 Therefore, it is not hard to see that
under perfect observability, a configuration is stable only if an equilibrium outcome
is Pareto efficient, rather than a Nash equilibrium, in the objective game. This re-
sult also indicates that an individual endowed with materialist preferences, which
coincide with fitness maximization, may have no evolutionary advantage. 7
In the single-population model established by Dekel et al. (2007), if a configu-
ration is stable under complete information, the fitness an incumbent receives in
each of his matches is efficient ; moreover, the efficient fitness is obviously unique
for a symmetric objective game. 8 9 In our multi-population setting, although the
forms of Pareto efficiency may not be unique and the populations are allowed to be
polymorphic, the uniqueness of the fitness vector can still be ensured for a stable
configuration, in the sense that all equilibrium outcomes adopted by n matched in-
cumbents correspond to the same Pareto-efficient fitness vector. An efficient form
of a stable configuration for an objective game is well defined, and it is determined
by an initial preference distribution.
When the number of populations is equal to two, we obtain a simple sufficient
condition for stability under complete information: a Pareto-efficient strict Nash
equilibrium of the objective game is stable. This result would also lead us to see
that another concept of multi-population stability, such as in Taylor (1979), can
achieve different stability properties. However, if the number of populations in-
creases, then mutants may have opportunities to take evolutionary advantages by
applying various correlated deviations regardless of the incumbents’ responses, and
so the stability may be difficult to attain. We present several examples of three-
player games which are particularly useful in helping us understand how multiple
populations interact with one another to destroy Pareto-efficient strict Nash equi-
libria, even though these are Pareto-efficient strong Nash equilibria. Compared to
the results of studies of evolutionarily stable strategies in asymmetric games, once
again, the characteristic of the indirect evolutionary approach causes a dramatic
change in the existence of stable multi-population configurations.
We then study the case of unobservable preferences, where players know only the
distribution of opponents’ preferences in every population; the interactions among
players can be described as an n-player Bayesian game. Here the stability criterion
is consistent with the concept used for perfect observability. In contrast to that
6Robson (1990) demonstrates that any inefficient ESS can be destroyed by the so-called “secret
handshake” mutant.
7Heifetz et al. (2007) show a similar result established for almost every game with continuous
strategy spaces: under any payoff-monotonic selection dynamics, the population does not converge
to material payoff-maximizing behavior.
8Efficiency of a strategy in a symmetric two-player game means that no other strategy yields
a strictly higher fitness when played against itself.
9When preferences are observable, the tendency towards efficient strategy is a general property
of single-population models based on the indirect evolutionary approach; see also Possajennikov
(2005) and von Widekind (2008).
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of Dekel et al. (2007), our criterion rejects the incumbents’ post-entry strategies
that are too far from the originals. We give an example to show how the difference
between the two stability criteria affects the determination of the stability of a
configuration.
Since players cannot adjust their strategies according to specific opponents in
this case, a non-Nash outcome will be destabilized by entrants adopting material
payoff-maximizing behavior. It is also easy to see that under incomplete infor-
mation, individuals endowed with materialist preferences have evolutionary advan-
tages. Thus, whether such a materialist configuration is stable will depend on
whether the incumbents’ post-entry strategies are nearly unchanged. We show
that a strategy profile can be supported by stable materialist preferences if it is
a strict Nash equilibrium or a completely mixed Nash equilibrium or the unique
Nash equilibrium of the objective game. The indirect evolutionary approach with
unobservable preferences can be viewed as a refinement of the Nash equilibrium
concept different from the notion of a neutrally stable strategy (NSS), which was
introduced in Maynard Smith (1982).
Finally, we consider the case in which players observe their opponents’ prefer-
ences with probability p ∈ (0, 1), and know only the distribution of opponents’
preferences with probability 1 − p. The stability criterion defined in this interme-
diate case is such that the criteria under perfect observability and no observability
can be regarded as its two limits. This makes it possible to check the robust-
ness of the preceding stability results against small perturbations in the degrees of
observability for the case of pure-strategy outcomes.
In the single-population model of Dekel et al. (2007), efficiency is a necessary
condition for pure-strategy outcomes to be stable when observability is almost per-
fect. However, we provide a counterexample illustrating that the necessity result
in our multi-population setting with perfect observability is not robust. Unlike
efficiency defined for the single-population model, a Pareto improvement is not
a change leaving everyone strictly better off. Therefore, a Pareto-dominated out-
come in our model may not be destabilized if preferences are not perfectly observed.
Instead of Pareto efficiency, we show that weak Pareto efficiency is a necessary con-
dition for pure-strategy outcomes to be stable under almost perfect observability.
This result reveals that materialist preferences still may have no evolutionary ad-
vantage even if preferences are observed with noise. 10 In contrast, the necessity
result under no observability is robust: a pure-strategy outcome is stable under
almost no observability only if it is a Nash equilibrium of the objective game.
Regarding the sufficient conditions for stability, we show that when the num-
ber of populations is equal to two, a Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibrium of
the objective game remains stable for all degrees of observability. However, the
sufficiency result under no observability is not robust. We provide an example of
a prisoner’s dilemma situation in which the unique Nash equilibrium, also a strict
Nash equilibrium, is not stable for any positive probability of observing preferences.
The use of entrants’ cooperative strategies in this example indicates that efficiency
would play a role in preference evolution as long as preferences are not completely
unobservable.
10In games with continuous action sets, Heifetz et al. (2007) also show, by means of a spe-
cific example, that payoff-maximizing behavior need not prevail when preferences are imperfectly
observed.
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2. The Model
Objective Games. Suppose that G is an n-player game with the player set N =
{1, . . . , n}. For each i ∈ N , denote by Ai the finite set of actions available to
player i, and define A =
∏
i∈N Ai. Let πi : A → R be the material payoff function
for player i. When an action profile a ∈ A is played, we interpret the material
payoff πi(a) as the reproductive fitness received by player i, which determines the
evolutionary success. Thus we also call πi the fitness function for player i. We write
the set of mixed strategies of player i as ∆(Ai), and denote the set of correlated
strategies by ∆(A). Each material payoff function πi can be extended by linearity
to a continuous function defined on the set
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai), or defined on the set ∆(A).
By combining the n material payoff functions, we obtain the vector-valued func-
tion π : A→ Rn that assigns to each action profile a the n-tuple (π1(a), . . . , πn(a)) of
fitness values. This fitness function π can also be extended to the set
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai),
or to the set ∆(A), through π1, . . . , πn. In the indirect evolutionary approach,
behavior of players is determined independently of the material payoff functions,
although players’ actual fitnesses are defined by them. We call this game G an
objective game.
Subjective Games. In contrast to an objective game, a subjective game describes
the strategic interactions among the players. There are n separate populations,
and the number of individuals in each population is infinite. In every game round,
players are drawn independently from the n populations, one from each population
randomly. Let such a game be repeated infinitely many times independently; then
it is plausible that a player will not take into account the effect of his current
behavior on the opponents’ future behavior.
Each player in the i-th population chooses an optimal strategy from the set ∆(Ai)
based on his own preferences and the information about his opponents’ preferences.
We assume that the subjective preferences of player i can be represented by a von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function which may be different from the material
payoff function πi. However, after each round of play, the actual fitness received
by player i is πi(σ) if a strategy profile σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is chosen by matched
players. Let Θ = RA, which represents the set of von Neumann–Morgenstern utility
functions on A. We refer to a utility function either as a preference type or as a
type; we identify it with a group of players who have such preferences and make the
same decisions. In real life, different individuals having the same preference relation
may adopt distinct strategies when they are indifferent among some alternatives.
In such a case, any two of these preferences can be represented by different utility
functions congruent modulo a positive affine transformation.
Assume that there are only a finite number of preference types in each popula-
tion. Denote by M(Θn) the set of all possible joint distributions of n independent
random variables defined on the same sample space Θ with finite support. Let
µ ∈ M(Θn). Then the support of µ can be written as suppµ =
∏
i∈N suppµi,
where µi is the marginal distribution over all types of player i. For a given pref-
erence profile θ ∈ suppµ and for k ∈ N , the conditional probability µ(θ−k|θk) is
equal to
∏
i6=k µi(θi). For notational simplicity, we write µ−k(θ−k) and suppµ−k for
µ(θ−k|θk) and
∏
i6=k suppµi, respectively. Similarly, we write suppµT and suppµ−T
for
∏
i∈T suppµi and
∏
i/∈T suppµi, respectively, where T is a nonempty proper
subset of N .
To enable a comparison with the single-population setting introduced in Dekel et al.
(2007), hereafter DEY, information about opponents’ types is described as follows.
For every i ∈ N , player i observes the opponents’ preferences with probability
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p ∈ [0, 1], and knows only the joint distribution µ−i over the opponents’ prefer-
ences with probability 1 − p. 11 The degree of observability p is an exogenous
parameter indicating the level of observation, and is common knowledge among all
players. But the two realizations, called perfect observability and no observability,
are private and independent across players. In every round, players choose best
responses to expected actions of others under a given degree of observability, which
can be described as an n-player Bayesian game. Such a game is denoted by Γp(µ)
and called a subjective game; the pair (G,Γp(µ)) is referred to as an environment.
The Stability Concept. According to the principle of the “survival of the fittest”,
only preference types earning the highest average fitness will survive. Thus, a
necessary condition for an environment (G,Γp(µ)) to be stable is that for any
i ∈ N , all incumbents in the i-th population, which constitute the set suppµi,
should receive the same average fitness. On the other hand, it is necessary to verify
whether the incumbents are immune to the competition from new entrants. Because
mutations are rare events, it is assumed that at the same time, there will be at most
one mutant type arising in each of the n populations. Let J = {i1, . . . , ik} be any
nonempty subset ofN . Amutant sub-profile for J , denoted by θ˜J , refers to a k-tuple
of preference types (θ˜i1 , . . . , θ˜ik) derived from
∏
j∈J (suppµj)
c
, where (suppµj)
c
is
the complement of suppµj .
12 The vector (εi1 , . . . , εik) of the population shares
of the k mutant types is often denoted simply by ε, and we define its norm to
be ‖ε‖ = max{εi1 , . . . , εik}.
13 After the mutants have entered, the resulting n
populations can be characterized by the post-entry distribution µ˜ε:
µ˜εi =
{
(1 − εi)µi + εiδθ˜i if i ∈ J ,
µi if i ∈ N \ J ,
where δθ˜i is the degenerate probability (Dirac measure) concentrated at θ˜i.
In a single-population evolutionary model, the static stability criterion generally
requires that mutants entering the population are eventually driven to extinction.
For multi-population settings, it should be natural to us to extend the stability
definition in terms of the notion of a mutant sub-profile, which would be regarded
as a unit of mutation. We say that a mutant sub-profile is driven out if one of
these mutant types will become extinct. In other words, a multi-population stabil-
ity criterion can be fulfilled if for any given mutant sub-profile, there are mutants
earning a lower average fitness than the incumbents in at least one population. The
reason for this is that in the models based on the indirect evolutionary approach,
interactions among mutants may look as if a sub-profile of mutants cooperate with
one another such that some of the mutants take fitness advantages at the expense
of the other mutants. Those fitness advantages will soon disappear when the latter
11Here, partial observability is used to model the noise in the cases of perfect observability
and no observability. For simplicity, we ignore the possibility that an individual has complete
information about the preferences of some of the opponents and has incomplete information about
the preferences of the others. We emphasize that the difference in the two noise settings does not
affect our results.
12It indicates that all preference relations satisfying the von Neumann–Morgenstern axioms are
allowed to compete, and that mutants are distinguishable from the incumbents in the post-entry
populations, although they may have the same preference relation.
13Since each population is assumed to be infinite, the population share of a mutant type can
take on any positive value, no matter how small it may be.
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go extinct. This concept is consistent with that of the multi-population ESS for-
mulated by Cressman (1992), one of the two most popular static stability criteria
for multi-population interactions. 14
Because there are no restrictions on the preference relations of entrants and the
best-response correspondences for different preferences may coincide, we allow that
mutants may survive in a post-entry environment to coexist with the incumbents,
but will not spread. 15 Our stability criterion is defined to identify when a joint
preference distribution and an adopted Bayesian–Nash equilibrium can form a sta-
ble configuration. Except that all incumbents in the same population earn the same
average fitness, a stable multi-population configuration should satisfy: after a rare
mutant sub-profile appears,
(1) the behavioral outcomes remain unchanged or nearly unchanged;
(2) the mutant sub-profile is driven out, or the incumbents can coexist with
the mutants in every population.
Along these lines, although the failure of a mutant sub-profile is determined solely
by one mutant type among them, such multi-population extension can quite satisfy
the appropriate stability conditions as introduced in DEY: there is no single mutant
sub-profile that can obviously destabilize the configuration including the behavioral
outcomes and the distribution of preferences (see Remarks 3.2.1 and 3.3.1).
We shall formally define stability criteria for various degrees of observability in
the following sections; these definitions follow the same principle of multi-population
stability. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for stability beginning with
the two extreme cases, p = 1 (perfect observability) and p = 0 (no observability).
Next, we consider intermediate cases, p ∈ (0, 1) (partial observability), such that
the two extreme cases can be regarded as its two limiting cases. We check whether
or not the preceding results, under p = 1 and p = 0, are robust against small
perturbations in p for the case of pure-strategy outcomes.
3. Perfect Observability
In this section we discuss the case where the degree of observability is equal to
one, that is, players’ preferences are common knowledge. Therefore, the subjective
game in each round of play can be seen as an n-player strategic game.
For a given probability distribution µ ∈ M(Θn), a strategy adopted by player i
under perfect observability is a function bi : suppµ → ∆(Ai).
16 The vector-
valued function b : suppµ→
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) defined by b(θ) = (b1(θ), . . . , bn(θ)) is an
equilibrium in the subjective game Γ1(µ) if for each θ ∈ suppµ, the strategy profile
b(θ) is a Nash equilibrium of the associated strategic game plated by the n-tuple θ,
that is, for each i ∈ N ,
bi(θ) ∈ argmax
σi∈∆(Ai)
θi
(
σi, b−i(θ)
)
,
where we write b−i(θ) instead of b(θ)−i. Let B1(µ) denote the set of all such
equilibria in Γ1(µ). A pair (µ, b) consisting of a preference distribution µ ∈ M(Θ
n)
and an equilibrium b ∈ B1(µ) is called a configuration. We define the aggregate
14There are two popular ways of extending the definition of an ESS to a multi-population
setting. One is due to Taylor (1979), and the other is due to Cressman (1992); see also Swinkels
(1992), Weibull (1995), and Sandholm (2010).
15This idea is consistent with the notion of a neutrally stable strategy.
16It is admitted that players whose preference types are congruent modulo a positive affine
transformation may adopt distinct strategies.
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outcome of a configuration (µ, b) as the probability distribution ϕµ,b over the set of
pure-strategy profiles:
ϕµ,b(a1, . . . , an) =
∑
θ∈suppµ
µ(θ)
∏
i∈N
bi(θ)(ai)
for every (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A, where bi(θ)(ai) is the probability assigned by bi(θ)
to ai. The aggregate outcome of a configuration can be regarded as a correlated
strategy belonging to ∆(A). A strategy profile σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is called an ag-
gregate outcome if the induced correlated strategy ϕσ is the aggregate outcome of
some configuration, where ϕσ is defined by ϕσ(a1, . . . , an) =
∏
i∈N σi(ai) for all
(a1, . . . , an) ∈ A.
By applying the law of large numbers to our setting, the average fitness of a type
θi ∈ suppµi with respect to (µ, b) for i ∈ N is given by
Πθi(µ; b) =
∑
θ′
−i
∈suppµ−i
µ−i(θ
′
−i)πi
(
b(θi, θ
′
−i)
)
,
on which the evolution of preferences depends. 17 For a configuration to be evolu-
tionarily stable, it is necessary to let every incumbent in the same population earn
the same average fitness.
Definition 3.1. A configuration (µ, b) is said to be balanced if for each i ∈ N , the
equality Πθi(µ; b) = Πθ′i(µ; b) holds for every θi, θ
′
i ∈ suppµi.
Under complete information, in order to satisfy the condition that rare mutants
cannot cause the behavioral outcomes to move far away, we assume that when n
incumbents are matched against one another, they continue to play the pre-entry
equilibrium, called the focal property. However, after an entry, it seems implausible
that we can say which equilibrium will be played when not all matched players are
incumbents. Thus, in such matches, there are no restrictions on the set of equilibria
from which they can choose.
Definition 3.2. Let (µ, b) be a configuration with perfect observability, and sup-
pose that a mutant sub-profile θ˜J ∈
∏
j∈J (suppµj)
c
with ε ∈ (0, 1)|J| is introduced.
In Γ1(µ˜
ε), a post-entry equilibrium b˜ ∈ B1(µ˜
ε) is focal relative to b if b˜(θ) = b(θ)
for every θ ∈ suppµ. Let B1(µ˜
ε; b) be the set of all focal equilibria relative to b in
Γ1(µ˜
ε), called a focal set.
Remark 3.2.1. When preferences are observable, the focal set B1(µ˜
ε; b) is always
nonempty regardless of how the population share vector ε is composed. In addition,
the desired property that ϕµ˜ε ,˜b → ϕµ,b as ‖ε‖ → 0 is naturally held for all b˜ ∈
B1(µ˜
ε; b).
Now the stability criterion for a perfectly observable environment can be defined.
Definition 3.3. In (G,Γ1(µ)), a configuration (µ, b) is said to be stable if it is
balanced, and if for any nonempty subset J ⊆ N and any mutant sub-profile
θ˜J ∈
∏
j∈J (suppµj)
c
, there exists some ǫ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every ε ∈ (0, 1)|J|
with ‖ε‖ ∈ (0, ǫ¯) and every b˜ ∈ B1(µ˜
ε; b), either Condition (i) or Condition (ii) is
satisfied:
(i) Πθj(µ˜
ε; b˜) > Πθ˜j (µ˜
ε; b˜) for some j ∈ J and for every θj ∈ suppµj ;
17The equation for average fitness indicates that the preference distribution is unchanged in
the process of learning to play an equilibrium. To justify this representation, we assume as in
most related literature that the evolution of preferences is infinitely slower than the process of
learning, which is supported by Selten (1991, p. 21).
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(ii) Πθi(µ˜
ε; b˜) = Πθ̂i(µ˜
ε; b˜) for every i ∈ N and for every θi, θ̂i ∈ supp µ˜
ε
i .
A strategy profile σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is stable if it is the aggregate outcome of some
stable configuration.
Condition (i) describes the case where every incumbent earns a strictly higher
average fitness than the mutant type in some population, and thus this mutant
sub-profile fails to invade. Condition (ii) describes the case where the post-entry
configuration is balanced; the incumbents and the mutants can continue to coexist
in every population. Let us for a moment follow the notion of evolutionary stability
introduced in Taylor (1979), where the fitness comparison between incumbents and
mutants should be done in the aggregate. Under such a view, the form of new
entrants could be represented as (θ̂1, . . . , θ̂n) /∈ suppµ with a population share ε,
and Condition (i) for a polymorphic configuration (µ, b) could be replaced by the
condition: ∑
i∈N
Πθi(µ˜
ε; b˜) >
∑
i∈N
Πθ̂i(µ˜
ε; b˜)
holds for every (θ1, . . . , θn) ∈ suppµ. Unlike extending the definition of an ESS to a
multi-population setting, such a stability criterion is indeed stronger than ours. The
key difference is the ability to adjust one’s strategies according to the opponents;
see the discussion after Theorem 3.10.
The following remarks describe the basic characteristics of our multi-population
stability criterion, which is defined separately for each information assumption.
Remark 3.3.1. If the multi-population stability criterion is reached, then no in-
cumbent would be wiped out, although Condition (i) can be determined just by
examining one of the populations for each mutant sub-profile. The intuition behind
this result is as follows. Let a mutant sub-profile θ˜J be introduced into a stable
configuration (µ, b), and suppose that Condition (i) holds. Then those mutants
with the lowest average fitness in their own populations will be wiped out. Such a
trend can make the sub-profile θ˜J converge to a smaller sub-profile θ˜J′ . Meanwhile,
the population shares of the incumbents may be slightly perturbed during this pro-
cess. One could therefore regard the post-entry environment at this time as the
perturbed configuration in which the new sub-profile θ˜J′ tries its luck. Recall that
the stable configuration (µ, b) is defined for any mutant sub-profile. Thus, after the
entry of θ˜J′ , either Condition (i) or Condition (ii) would be satisfied, provided that
the population shares of these remaining mutants are sufficiently small and that the
perturbations in the population shares of the incumbents do not affect the order
of their average fitness values. Such a repeated process would lead to the desired
goal.
Remark 3.3.2. In our stability criterion, the invasion barrier ǫ¯ seems to depend
on the mutant sub-profile. In fact, the existence of such an invasion barrier is
equivalent to the existence of a uniform invasion barrier. Consider an indifferent
mutant sub-profile θ˜0J for a nonempty subset J of N .
18 Since an indifferent type
θ˜0j is indifferent among all actions, all available actions will be dominant for him.
Hence, by the condition that all possible focal equilibria are admitted in a post-entry
environment, the barrier ǫ¯J which works for the indifferent mutant sub-profile θ˜
0
J
is certainly a uniform invasion barrier against all mutant sub-profiles for the subset
J . Thus, since the number of all subsets of N is finite, we have a uniform invasion
barrier that can work for all potential mutant sub-profiles. This also indicates
18A preference type is said to be indifferent if it is a constant utility function; a mutant
sub-profile is said to be indifferent if all its preference types are indifferent.
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that it is sufficient to check indifferent mutant sub-profiles, rather than all mutant
sub-profiles, in order to test the stability of a configuration.
Consider the Battle of the Sexes as introduced in Dawkins (1976), which refers
to the male–female conflict over parental care of offspring, and which is one of
the most simple asymmetric games without an ESS. The two female strategies are
coy and fast; the two male strategies are faithful and philandering. Coy females
insist on a long courtship before mating, whereas fast ones do not. All females
take care of their offspring. Faithful males tolerate a long courtship, and also care
for the offspring. Philanderers refuse to engage in a long courtship, and do not
care for their offspring. The value of the offspring to each parent is V . The cost of
raising the offspring is 2C, which can be borne by one parent only, or shared equally
between both parents. The cost of a long courtship is c to each participant. Let us
consider 0 < c < C < c + C < V < 2C. Then, as discussed in van Damme (1991,
p. 243), there is no strict Nash equilibrium, and so there is no ESS in such a case.
However, if the Battle of the Sexes is modeled by means of our multi-population
setting, then an evolutionarily stable outcome can exist in this game, as we will see
below.
Example 3.4. Let the fitness assignment be characterized by the Battle of the
Sexes game in which V = 15, C = 10, and c = 3; besides, the first population
consists of all males, and the second population consists of all females.
Coy Fast
Faithful 2, 2 5, 5
Philandering 0, 0 15, −5
Let preferences be observable. Suppose that all males have preferences such that
they are indifferent between being faithful and being philandering if a female is
fast. On the other hand, suppose that females’ preferences prompt them to be
coy if a male is a philanderer, and to be fast if a male is faithful. Then the pair
(Faithful,Fast) is a Nash equilibrium for such males and females, and this strategy
pair can be an evolutionarily stable outcome.
To see this, let (µ, b) be the configuration constructed as described above. It is
obvious that if mutants appear in only one of the two populations, their average
fitnesses cannot be greater than what the incumbents have. Consider two types
of mutants θ˜1 and θ˜2 entering the first and second populations with population
shares ε1 and ε2, respectively. Let b˜ be the chosen focal equilibrium, and suppose
that for i = 1, 2 and for θ−i ∈ suppµ−i, we have b˜i(θ˜i, θ−i) = (qi, 1 − qi) where
0 ≤ qi ≤ 1. If q1 6= 1, then the post-entry average fitnesses of θ1 and θ˜1 satisfy
Πθ1(µ˜
ε; b˜) ≥ 5(1− ε2) and Πθ˜1(µ˜
ε; b˜) ≤ 2q1(1− ε2) + 15ε2, respectively. It follows
that Πθ1(µ˜
ε; b˜) > Πθ˜1(µ˜
ε; b˜) whenever ε2 < 3/18. Clearly if q1 = 1 and q2 6= 0,
then the post-entry average fitness of θ2 is equal to 5, and it is strictly greater than
that of θ˜2. Finally if q1 = 1 and q2 = 0, then the fitness to each individual in each
match is 5 except in (θ˜1, θ˜2). When the mutants θ˜1 and θ˜2 are matched together,
the Pareto efficiency of the strategy pair (Faithful,Fast) implies that the conditions
affording mutants an evolutionary advantage in the first population can result in
fitness loss for mutants in the second population. Therefore, we can conclude that
the strategy pair (Faithful,Fast) is stable, for which a uniform invasion barrier ǫ¯
can be choosen as 3/18.
We list the definitions concerning Pareto efficiency.
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Definition 3.5. Let (N,A, π) be a finite strategic game, and let σ and σ′ be
strategy profiles belonging to
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai). The strategy profile σ strongly Pareto
dominates the strategy profile σ′ if πi(σ) > πi(σ
′) for all i ∈ N . The strategy
profile σ is weakly Pareto efficient if there does not exist another strategy profile
that strongly Pareto dominates σ.
The strategy profile σ Pareto dominates the strategy profile σ′ if πi(σ) ≥ πi(σ
′)
for all i ∈ N and πj(σ) > πj(σ
′) for some j ∈ N . The strategy profile σ is Pareto
efficient if there does not exist another strategy profile that Pareto dominates σ.
In Example 3.4, the stable outcome (Faithful,Fast) is a Pareto-efficient strategy
profile in the Battle of the Sexes game. Our first result will show that this is also
true in the general case: if a configuration is stable under perfect observability, then
any equilibrium outcome adopted by nmatched incumbents must be Pareto efficient
with respect to the fitness function π. The reason is simple. If the outcome is not
Pareto efficient, the mutants having the “secret handshake” flavour can destroy
this inefficient outcome. These mutants behave based on their own preferences;
they maintain the pre-entry outcome when matched against the incumbents, and
achieve a more efficient outcome when matched against themselves. Accordingly,
the observability of preferences plays a key role in obtaining the “stable only if
efficient” result.
It is convenient to use the following notation for our multi-population case.
Suppose that we are given two n-tuples z = (z1, . . . , zn) and x = (x1, . . . , xn). For
any subset T ⊆ N , a new n-tuple (zT , x−T ) can be constructed by letting
(zT , x−T )i =
{
zi if i ∈ T ,
xi if i ∈ N \ T .
If T = ∅ or N , then (zT , x−T ) refers to (x1, . . . , xn) or (z1, . . . , zn), respectively.
Theorem 3.6. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration in (G,Γ1(µ)). Then for each
θ ∈ suppµ, the equilibrium outcome b(θ) is Pareto efficient with respect to π.
Proof. Suppose that there exists θ¯ ∈ suppµ such that b(θ¯) is not Pareto efficient,
that is, there exists σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) such that πi(σ) ≥ πi
(
b(θ¯)
)
for all i ∈ N and
πj(σ) > πj
(
b(θ¯)
)
for some j ∈ N . Let an indifferent mutant profile θ˜0 = (θ˜01 , . . . , θ˜
0
n)
be introduced with its population share vector ε = (ε1, . . . , εn). Let the focal
equilibrium b˜ ∈ B1(µ˜
ε; b) be chosen to satisfy (1) b˜(θ˜0) = σ; (2) for any proper
subset T  N and any θ−T ∈ suppµ−T , we have b˜(θ˜
0
T , θ−T ) = b(θ¯T , θ−T ).
19
Then, for every i ∈ N , the difference between the average fitnesses of θ˜0i and θ¯i is
Πθ˜0
i
(µ˜ε; b˜)−Πθ¯i(µ˜
ε; b˜) = µ˜ε−i(θ˜
0
−i)
[
πi(σ)− πi
(
b(θ¯)
)]
.
Thus, for any vector ε ∈ (0, 1)n, we have Πθ˜0
i
(µ˜ε; b˜) ≥ Πθ¯i(µ˜
ε; b˜) for every i ∈ N ,
and Πθ˜0
j
(µ˜ε; b˜) > Πθ¯j (µ˜
ε; b˜) for some j ∈ N . This means that the configuration
(µ, b) is not stable. 
A single-population model underlying the indirect evolutionary approach, as in
DEY, always shows that when preferences are observed, efficiency is a necessary
condition for stability, in the sense that the fitness each incumbent receives in each
interaction is efficient. Of course, the concept of efficiency specially defined for
symmetric games is distinct from the concept of Pareto efficiency. The efficient
19In most cases, indifferent types are used instead of potential entrants that are well adapted
to the environments, without specifying their preferences explicitly. We will frequently use this
convenient device throughout the paper.
12 YU-SUNG TU AND WEI-TORNG JUANG
fitness used in a single-population model could not be meaningfully applied to a
model with n separate populations.
Unlike strategic interactions in a single-population setting, here an individual
will only meet opponents coming from the other populations. Thus the same sym-
metric objective game considered in different population settings could induce quite
different stable outcomes, as we will see in the next example.
Example 3.7. Let the following anti-coordination game denote the fitness assign-
ment, where ν > 0, ω > 10, and ν + ω > 20. Suppose that preferences are
observable, and that each player i has the same action set {a1, a2}.
a1 a2
a1 10, 10 ν, ω
a2 ω, ν 0, 0
The efficient strategy σ∗ in this symmetric objective game is such that σ∗(a1) =
ν+ω
2(ν+ω−10) with the efficient fitness
(ν+ω)2
4(ν+ω−10) . When considered in the single-
population model introduced by DEY, the unique efficient strategy profile (σ∗, σ∗)
is DEY-stable if and only if the equality ν = ω holds. Therefore, if the DEY-stable
outcome exists, the efficient fitness is ν
2
2ν−10 , which is strictly less than ν and ω.
In the case where ν = ω, all Pareto-efficient strategy profiles in this objective
game are (a1, a2) and (a2, a1), and so Theorem 3.6 implies that the strategy profile
(σ∗, σ∗) cannot be stable in the sense of multi-population stability. The reason
for the difference between the single- and two-population settings is that when
the interaction takes place between two mutants from separate populations, they
can choose a suitable strategy profile, (a1, a2) or (a2, a1), to gain evolutionary
advantages. However, this cannot happen in a single-population setting, where the
mutant type a mutant can encounter is himself. Theorem 3.10 will guarantee that
the Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibria (a1, a2) and (a2, a1) can be stable if the
two-population setting is applied to this symmetric game.
Theorem 3.6 says that configurations in our multi-population model tend towards
Pareto efficiency whenever preferences are observable. Unlike the efficient fitness
for a symmetric game, Pareto-efficient fitness vectors are generally not unique for
an arbitrary game. Nevertheless, we can show that if a configuration is stable under
perfect observability, the incumbents in the same population always earn the same
fitness in each of their interactions, no matter who their opponents are; the fitness
vector for any tuple of matched individuals is unique, no matter who their members
are.
Lemma 3.8. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration in (G,Γ1(µ)). Then the equality
π
(
b(θ)
)
= π
(
b(θ′)
)
holds for every θ, θ′ ∈ suppµ.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by proving its equivalent statement: If (µ, b) is a
stable configuration in (G,Γ1(µ)), then for any nonempty subset S ⊆ N and any
θ′S , θ
′′
S ∈ suppµS , the equality
πi
(
b(θ′S , θ−S)
)
= πi
(
b(θ′′S , θ−S)
)
is valid for all i ∈ S and all θ−S ∈ suppµ−S .
We begin with the case that S satisfies |S| = 1. Suppose that there exist θ′j , θ
′′
j ∈
suppµj for some j ∈ N such that πj
(
b(θ′j , θ¯−j)
)
> πj
(
b(θ′′j , θ¯−j)
)
for some θ¯−j ∈
suppµ−j . Let θ˜
0
j ∈ (suppµj)
c
be an indifferent type entering the j-th population
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with a population share ε ∈ (0, 1). Let b˜ ∈ B1(µ˜
ε; b) be the adopted equilibrium
satisfying b˜(θ˜0j , θ¯−j) = b(θ
′
j , θ¯−j) and b˜(θ˜
0
j , θ−j) = b(θ
′′
j , θ−j) for any θ−j 6= θ¯−j .
Then, by comparing the average fitness of θ˜0j with that of θ
′′
j , we have
Πθ˜0
j
(µ˜ε; b˜)−Πθ′′
j
(µ˜ε; b˜) = µ−j(θ¯−j)
[
πj
(
b(θ′j , θ¯−j)
)
− πj
(
b(θ′′j , θ¯−j)
)]
> 0
for any ε ∈ (0, 1). This means that (µ, b) is not stable in (G,Γ1(µ)).
Let k ≥ 2, and suppose as an inductive hypothesis that the equality holds for
a subset S whenever the number, say m, of S satisfies 1 ≤ m ≤ k − 1. Now
let T be a subset of N with |T | = k. Suppose that there exist θ′T , θ
′′
T ∈ suppµT
and j ∈ T such that πj
(
b(θ′T , θ¯−T )
)
> πj
(
b(θ′′T , θ¯−T )
)
for some θ¯−T ∈ suppµ−T .
Consider an indifferent mutant sub-profile θ˜0T−j with its population share vector
ε, where T−j denotes T \ {j}. The focal equilibrium b˜ can be chosen to satisfy:
for any U ⊆ T−j and any θ−U ∈ suppµ−U , we have b˜(θ˜
0
U , θ−U ) = b(θ
′
T , θ¯−T ) if
(θ˜0U , θ−U ) = (θ˜
0
T−j
, θ′j , θ¯−T ), and otherwise b˜(θ˜
0
U , θ−U ) = b(θ
′′
U , θ−U ).
By our inductive hypothesis, it is not hard to see that Πθ˜0s
(µ˜ε; b˜) = Πθs(µ˜
ε; b˜)
for each s ∈ T−j and each θs ∈ suppµs. To verify this, compare fitness values
received by θ˜0s and θs when matched against the same opponents. For example,
if the opponents are θ˜0T−js , θ
′
j , and θ¯−T , where T−js denotes T \ {j, s}, then the
properties of b˜ imply that the fitness of θ˜0s is πs
(
b(θ′s, θ
′
T−js
, θ′j , θ¯−T )
)
, and that the
fitness of θs is πs
(
b(θs, θ
′′
T−js
, θ′j, θ¯−T )
)
. Of course, the two fitness values are equal
by our inductive hypothesis. On the other hand, the difference between the average
fitnesses of θ′j and θ
′′
j can be obtained as
Πθ′
j
(µ˜ε; b˜)−Πθ′′
j
(µ˜ε; b˜) = µ−j(θ˜
0
T−j , θ¯−T )
[
πj
(
b(θ′T , θ¯−T )
)
− πj
(
b(θ′′T , θ¯−T )
)]
> 0
regardless of the population share vector ε. Thus, (µ, b) is not stable in (G,Γ1(µ)),
as desired. 
When preferences are observable, Theorem 3.6 and Lemma 3.8 imply that al-
though these separate populations may be polymorphic, a stable configuration in-
duces a unique fitness vector lying on the Pareto frontier of the noncooperative
payoff region of the objective game. 20 The average fitness of an incumbent is
equal to the fitness value that all incumbents in the same population can earn in
each of their matches. Besides, the fitness vector corresponding to a stable aggre-
gate outcome just consists of the fitness values obtained from any matching of the
incumbents.
Theorem 3.9. Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration in (G,Γ1(µ)), and let ϕµ,b be
the aggregate outcome of (µ, b). Then for each i ∈ N ,
Πθ¯i(µ; b) = πi
(
b(θ)
)
= πi(ϕµ,b)
for any θ¯i ∈ suppµi and any θ ∈ suppµ.
Proof. Since (µ, b) is stable, by Lemma 3.8, we let v∗ = π
(
b(θ)
)
for θ ∈ suppµ.
Then for each i ∈ N and any θ¯i ∈ suppµi, the equality Πθ¯i(µ; b) = v
∗
i is obvious.
On the other hand, for any i ∈ N , we have
πi(ϕµ,b) =
∑
a∈A
ϕµ,b(a)πi(a) =
∑
θ∈suppµ
µ(θ)
∑
a∈A
[ ∏
s∈N
bs(θ)(as)
]
πi(a) = v
∗
i
since πi
(
b(θ)
)
=
∑
a∈A
[∏
s∈N bs(θ)(as)
]
πi(a) for all θ ∈ suppµ. 
20The noncooperative payoff region of an n-player game (N,A, pi) refers to the n-dimensional
range pi
(∏
i∈N ∆(Ai)
)
.
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For any symmetric two-player game considered in a single-population setting, the
efficient fitness is certainly uniquely determined for all stable configurations. How-
ever, for an arbitrary objective game, stable configurations in our multi-population
model may correspond to different Pareto-efficient fitness vectors; the efficient types
of stable aggregate outcomes would be determined by initial distributions of pref-
erences. As in Example 3.7, the strategy profiles (a1, a2) and (a2, a1) with different
efficient types could serve as two stable aggregate outcomes supported, respectively,
by different preference distributions. This can be confirmed after studying the suf-
ficient condition for stability.
In the single-population model of DEY with complete information, it is shown
that efficient strict Nash equilibria of a symmetric two-player game are stable; see
also Possajennikov (2005). In the following theorem, we give a sufficient condition
for the two-population setting: in an arbitrary two-player game, every Pareto-
efficient strict Nash equilibrium can be an evolutionarily stable outcome. At first
glance, it seems easy to understand. Suppose that each strategy in a strict Nash
equilibrium of an objective game is supported by preferences for which the strategy
is strictly dominant. Then any mutant type with a small population share will
be wiped out if the mutants adopt any other strategy when matched against the
incumbents. On the other hand, Pareto efficiency implies that when two mutants
from separate populations are matched, the fitness of one mutant type cannot be
improved without worsening the fitness of the other. All this seems quite straight-
forward. However, unlike in the single-population setting, it is difficult to find a
uniform invasion barrier valid for all focal equilibria in the two-population setting.
21
Theorem 3.10. Let G be a two-player game and let (a∗1, a
∗
2) be Pareto efficient
with respect to π. If (a∗1, a
∗
2) is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, then (a
∗
1, a
∗
2) is
stable in (G,Γ1(µ)) for some µ ∈M(Θ
2).
Proof. Let (a∗1, a
∗
2) be a strict Nash equilibrium of G, and suppose that it is not
a stable strategy profile. We shall show that (a∗1, a
∗
2) is not Pareto efficient with
respect to π. To see this, consider a monomorphic configuration (µ, b) where each
i-th population consists of θ∗i for which a
∗
i is the strictly dominant strategy. Then
(a∗1, a
∗
2) is the aggregate outcome of (µ, b), and hence this configuration cannot be
stable under our assumptions on (a∗1, a
∗
2). This means that there exists a mutant
sub-profile θ˜J for some J ⊆ {1, 2} such that for every ǫ¯ ∈ (0, 1), these mutants, with
some ε ∈ (0, 1)|J| satisfying ‖ε‖ ∈ (0, ǫ¯), can adopt an equilibrium b˜ ∈ B1(µ˜
ε; b) to
gain evolutionary advantages over the incumbents, that is, Πθ˜j (µ˜
ε; b˜) ≥ Πθ∗
j
(µ˜ε; b˜)
for all j ∈ J , and Πθ˜k(µ˜
ε; b˜) > Πθ∗
k
(µ˜ε; b˜) for some k ∈ J .
In the case where |J | = 1, it is clear that mutants have no evolutionary advantage
since (a∗1, a
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium. Let J = {1, 2}, and suppose that (θ˜1, θ˜2) is a
mutant pair having an evolutionary advantage. For a given ε ∈ (0, 1)2 and for each
i ∈ {1, 2}, the post-entry average fitness of the incumbent type θ∗i is
Πθ∗
i
(µ˜ε; b˜) = (1− ε−i)πi(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) + ε−iπi
(
a∗i , b˜−i(θ
∗
i , θ˜−i)
)
.
21Note that perfect observability is a limiting case of partial observability, which will be studied
in Section 5. When preferences are unobservable, each individual knows the joint distribution over
the types before deciding which strategy will be adopted. This implies throughout the paper that
the stability criterion can only be defined by taking a uniform invasion barrier against all focal
equilibria, rather than an invasion barrier depending on a given focal equilibrium.
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On the other hand, the post-entry average fitness of the mutant type θ˜i is
Πθ˜i(µ˜
ε; b˜) = (1 − ε−i)πi
(
b˜i(θ˜i, θ
∗
−i), a
∗
−i
)
+ ε−iπi
(
b˜(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
.
Using the assumption that the mutant pair (θ˜1, θ˜2) has an evolutionary advantage,
we gradually reduce ǫ¯ to 0, and then the sequence of the norms of the corresponding
population share vectors converges to 0. We can choose a sequence {b˜t} from the
corresponding focal equilibria such that one of the three following cases occurs. To
complete the proof, we will show that (a∗1, a
∗
2) is Pareto dominated in any one of
these cases.
Case 1: b˜ti(θ˜i, θ
∗
−i) = a
∗
i for each i and each t. Since (θ˜1, θ˜2) has an evolutionary
advantage, it follows that each b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2) Pareto dominates (a
∗
1, a
∗
2).
Case 2: b˜ti(θ˜i, θ
∗
−i) 6= a
∗
i and b˜
t
−i(θ
∗
i , θ˜−i) = a
∗
−i for fixed i and for every t. Without
loss of generality, suppose that i = 1. Let b˜t1(θ˜1, θ
∗
2) = (1 − ζ
t
1)a
∗
1 + ζ
t
1σ
t
1, where
σt1 ∈ ∆(A1 \ {a
∗
1}) and ζ
t
1 ∈ (0, 1] for all t. Since (θ˜1, θ˜2) has an evolutionary
advantage and (a∗1, a
∗
2) is a strict Nash equilibrium, we have
εt2
1− εt2
≥
ζt1[π1(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π1(σ
t
1, a
∗
2)]
π1
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− π1(a∗1, a
∗
2)
> 0
in which π1
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
> π1(a
∗
1, a
∗
2), and
ζt1[π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π2(σ
t
1, a
∗
2)] ≥ π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π2
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
for every t. We can assume that π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) > π2
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
for all t; otherwise
(a∗1, a
∗
2) is Pareto dominated by b˜
t(θ˜1, θ˜2) for some t. Then π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) > π2(σ
t
1, a
∗
2)
for all t. Defining
κ = min
{
π1(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π1(σ
t
1, a
∗
2)
π2(a∗1, a
∗
2)− π2(σ
t
1, a
∗
2)
∣∣∣∣ σt1 ∈ ∆(A1 \ {a∗1}), t ∈ Z+} ,
it can be deduced that
εt2
1− εt2
≥
κ
[
π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π2
(˜
bt(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)]
π1
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− π1(a∗1, a
∗
2)
> 0
for every t. Since ǫ¯ converges to 0, we obtain
lim
t→∞
π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π2
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
π1
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− π1(a∗1, a
∗
2)
= 0,
and it implies that π
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
converges to π(a∗1, a
∗
2). Otherwise, by applying the
fact that the noncooperative payoff region π
(∏2
i=1∆(Ai)
)
is compact, there exists a
strategy profile (σ˜1, σ˜2) such that π(σ˜1, σ˜2) is a limit point of the set { π
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
|
t ∈ Z+ }, and it Pareto dominates (a∗1, a
∗
2) in terms of π1(σ˜1, σ˜2) > π1(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) and
π2(σ˜1, σ˜2) = π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2).
Summing up, we deduce that there exists a sequence {π
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
} converg-
ing to π(a∗1, a
∗
2) with π1
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
> π1(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) and π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) > π2
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
for
all t; moreover, the curve connecting the sequence has a horizontal tangent line at
π(a∗1, a
∗
2). If π(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) lies on the Pareto frontier of π
(∏2
i=1∆(Ai)
)
, then intuitively
it seems that there exists a strictly convex subregion of π
(∏2
i=1∆(Ai)
)
contain-
ing this sequence, which contradicts the shape of a noncooperative payoff region.
Therefore (a∗1, a
∗
2) should not be a Pareto-efficient strategy profile. This can be
formally proved using the properties of extreme points of a noncooperative payoff
region; see Tu and Juang (2017).
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Case 3: b˜ti(θ˜i, θ
∗
−i) 6= a
∗
i for all i and all t. For each i ∈ {1, 2}, let b˜
t
i(θ˜i, θ
∗
−i) = (1−
ξti)a
∗
i + ξ
t
iσ
t
i where σ
t
i ∈ ∆(Ai \ {a
∗
i }) and ξ
t
i ∈ (0, 1] for all t. Note that (a
∗
1, a
∗
2) is a
strict Nash equilibrium, that the mutant pair (θ˜1, θ˜2) has an evolutionary advantage,
and that the corresponding norm ‖εt‖ converges to 0. Thus, by comparing the post-
entry average fitnesses of θ∗i and θ˜i, we obtain
εt−i
1− εt−i
≥
ξti [πi(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− πi(σ
t
i , a
∗
−i)]
πi
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− πi(a∗1, a
∗
2) + ξ
t
−i[πi(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− πi(a
∗
i , σ
t
−i)]
> 0
for all i and all t, and it follows that
1
ξti
[
πi
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− πi(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)
]
→∞ or
ξt−i
ξti
[πi(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− πi(a
∗
i , σ
t
−i)]→∞
for each i ∈ {1, 2}. We discuss all the possibilities. If
1
ξt1
[
π1
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− π1(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)
]
→∞ and
1
ξt2
[
π2
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)
]
→∞
occur simultaneously, then (a∗1, a
∗
2) is Pareto dominated. Next, because ξ
t
2/ξ
t
1 →∞
and ξt1/ξ
t
2 →∞ cannot occur simultaneously, the remaining possibility is that
1
ξti
[
πi
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− πi(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)
]
→∞ and
ξti
ξt−i
[π−i(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π−i(σ
t
i , a
∗
−i)]→∞,
where either i = 1 or i = 2. In each case, it implies that ξt1 → 0 and ξ
t
2 → 0.
Without loss of generality, let i = 1. Then it is reasonable to suppose that the
sequence {b˜t} is chosen satisfying π1
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
> π1(a
∗
1, a
∗
2). Hence we can assume
that π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) > π2
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
for every t; otherwise (a∗1, a
∗
2) is Pareto dominated
by some b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2). From comparing the post-entry average fitness of θ
∗
2 with that
of θ˜2, we know that
π2
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) + ξ
t
1[π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π2(σ
t
1, a
∗
2)] > 0.
Then
ξt1[π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π2(σ
t
1, a
∗
2)]
π1
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− π1(a∗1, a
∗
2)
>
π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π2
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
π1
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− π1(a∗1, a
∗
2)
> 0
for all t. Because we let i = 1, and the term π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π2(σ
t
1, a
∗
2) is bounded, we
can conclude that
lim
t→∞
π2(a
∗
1, a
∗
2)− π2
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
π1
(
b˜t(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
− π1(a∗1, a
∗
2)
= 0.
Then, as discussed in Case 2 of this proof, the strategy profile (a∗1, a
∗
2) cannot be
Pareto efficient. 
Let a∗ be a Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibrium of a two-player game, so
that it is stable by Theorem 3.10. Now suppose that the utilitarian social welfare
function is not maximized at a∗, that is, there is a strategy pair a¯ such that
π1(a¯) + π2(a¯) > π1(a
∗) + π2(a
∗).
Then a configuration supporting the aggregate outcome a∗ would be invaded and
displaced by a mutant pair with the “secret handshake” flavour, provided that
the criterion for invasion is derived based on Taylor (1979), as described after
Definition 3.3. Such a mutant pair can destroy a∗ by selecting a¯ when matched
against themselves and by maintaining a∗ when matched against the incumbents.
This says that a∗ cannot be stable under this stability criterion, where evolution-
ary success depends on the aggregation of the average fitnesses. Therefore, unlike
extending the ESS concept for asymmetric two-population games, the concepts of
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stability introduced by Taylor (1979) and Cressman (1992) are not equivalent in the
multi-population models based on the indirect evolutionary approach with perfect
observability.
Regarding the sufficient conditions for stability, it is worth emphasizing that
when the number of populations is greater than or equal to three, the properties
of Pareto-efficient strict Nash equilibria are not sufficient for a strategy profile to
be stable. It is crucial to note that when the number of populations increases,
there may exist possibilities of correlated deviations such that mutants could have
evolutionary advantages over the incumbents without expense to themselves. For
this reason, a stable strategy profile may fail to exist, even though the objective
game has a Pareto-efficient strong Nash equilibrium. 22 The following examples
will illustrate some of these various possibilities.
Example 3.11. Let the objective game G be the following three-player game,
and suppose that the set of possible actions available to player i is {ai1, ai2} for
i = 1, 2, 3.
a21 a22
a11 7, 7, 7 3, 1, 3
a12 1, 3, 3 8, 7, 0
a31
a21 a22
a11 1, 3, 3 0, 0, 0
a12 0, 0, 0 7, 7, 0
a32
Then the strategy profile (a11, a21, a31) is a Pareto-efficient strong Nash equilib-
rium of G. Suppose that preferences are observable, and let (µ, b) be a configu-
ration with the aggregate outcome (a11, a21, a31), so that b(θ) = (a11, a21, a31) for
all θ ∈ suppµ. Consider three indifferent mutant types θ˜01 , θ˜
0
2, and θ˜
0
3 entering
the three populations, respectively. Consider the focal equilibrium b˜ that satis-
fies the conditions: (1) b˜(θ̂1, θ̂2, θ̂3) = (a12, a22, σ3) if θ̂1 = θ˜
0
1 , θ̂2 = θ˜
0
2, and θ̂3 is
an incumbent in suppµ3 adopting the strategy σ3 ∈ ∆({a31, a32}); (2) otherwise
b˜(θ̂1, θ̂2, θ̂3) = (a11, a21, a31).
It is easy to verify that no matter what the mutants’ population share vector ε is
and no matter what the strategy σ3 an incumbent in the third population adopts, we
have Πθ˜0
1
(µ˜ε; b˜) ≥ Πθ1(µ˜
ε; b˜), Πθ˜0
2
(µ˜ε; b˜) = Πθ2(µ˜
ε; b˜), and Πθ˜0
3
(µ˜ε; b˜) > Πθ3(µ˜
ε; b˜)
for all incumbents θ1, θ2, and θ3. Additionally, if there is an incumbent in the third
population who does not adopt the pure strategy a32 when matched against θ˜
0
1 and
θ˜02, then Πθ˜0
1
(µ˜ε; b˜) > Πθ1(µ˜
ε; b˜) for all θ1 ∈ suppµ1. Thus (a11, a21, a31) cannot be
a stable aggregate outcome.
The features discussed in Example 3.11 can be generalized.
Proposition 3.12. Let σ∗ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) be a strategy profile in G. Suppose that
there exist J ⊆ N and σ˜J ∈
∏
j∈J ∆(Aj) such that for each σ−J ∈
∏
i∈N\J ∆(Ai),
πj(σ˜J , σ−J ) ≥ πj(σ
∗)
for all j ∈ J . Then σ∗ cannot be stable under perfect observability either if for a
given σ−J the above inequality is strict for at least one j, or if there exists some
fixed k ∈ N \ J such that πk(σ
∗) > πk(σ˜J , σ−J ) for all σ−J ∈
∏
i∈N\J ∆(Ai).
22A strategy profile x is a strong Nash equilibrium if for any J ⊆ N and any σJ ∈
∏
j∈J ∆(Aj),
there exists some k ∈ J such that pik(x) ≥ pik(σJ , x−J ).
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Proof. Suppose that for each σ−J ∈
∏
i∈N\J ∆(Ai), there exists j ∈ J such that
πj(σ˜J , σ−J ) > πj(σ
∗). Let (µ, b) be a stable configuration with the aggregate
outcome σ∗, so that by Theorem 3.9, π
(
b(θ)
)
= π(σ∗) for all θ ∈ suppµ. Consider
an indifferent mutant sub-profile θ˜0J with its population share vector ε. Let b˜ be the
adopted focal equilibrium satisfying: (1) π
(
b˜(θ˜0S , θ−S)
)
= π(σ∗) for any S  J and
any θ−S ∈ suppµ−S ; (2) b˜(θ˜
0
J , θ−J) = (σ˜J , σ−J ) for any θ−J ∈ suppµ−J , where
σ−J is a possible strategy profile chosen by θ−J . Then, regardless of the vector ε,
the incumbent populations can be invaded, and at least one θ˜0j will take over the
entire j-th population. This is a contradiction to the stability of (µ, b).
Now suppose that there exists a fixed k ∈ N \J such that πk(σ
∗) > πk(σ˜J , σ−J)
for all σ−J ∈
∏
i∈N\J ∆(Ai). Similarly, the existence of a stable configuration
with the aggregate outcome σ∗ would yield a contradiction, since such a stable
configuration, say (µ, b), can be invaded and displaced by an indifferent mutant sub-
profile θ˜0J∪{k}, provided that the adopted focal equilibrium b˜ satisfies the conditions:
(1) b˜(θ̂) = (σ˜J , σ−J) if θ̂ = (θ˜
0
J , θ−J), where θ−J consists of incumbents from
suppµ−J and σ−J is a strategy profile chosen by them; (2) otherwise the equation
π
(
b˜(θ̂)
)
= π(σ∗) holds. Here, the mutant type θ˜0k would spread to the entire k-th
population. 
In addition to the above possibilities, evolutionary advantages of mutants also
can come from the averages over their interactions.
Example 3.13. Suppose that preferences are observable. Let the following three-
player game represent the objective game G, and let {ai1, ai2} be the action set of
player i for i = 1, 2, 3.
a21 a22
a11 7, 7, 7 9, 6, 0
a12 6, 0, 9 6, 0, 9
a31
a21 a22
a11 0, 9, 6 9, 6, 0
a12 0, 9, 6 1, 1, 1
a32
In this game, there are additional conditions imposed on the Pareto-efficient strong
Nash equilibrium (a11, a21, a31): the fitness values of all the deviants will be reduced
for any deviation. Even so, this strategy profile (a11, a21, a31) is not stable. To
verify this, let (a11, a21, a31) be the aggregate outcome of a configuration (µ, b). For
i = 1, 2, 3, consider an indifferent mutant type θ˜0i entering the i-th population with
a population share εi, and suppose that the adopted focal equilibrium b˜ satisfies
the conditions: for any (θ1, θ2, θ3) ∈ suppµ,
b˜(θ˜01 , θ2, θ3) = b˜(θ1, θ˜
0
2 , θ3) = b˜(θ1, θ2, θ˜
0
3) = b˜(θ˜
0
1 , θ˜
0
2, θ˜
0
3) = (a11, a21, a31),
b˜1(θ˜
0
1 , θ˜
0
2, θ3) = a11, b˜2(θ˜
0
1 , θ˜
0
2, θ3) = a22,
b˜1(θ˜
0
1 , θ2, θ˜
0
3) = a12, b˜3(θ˜
0
1 , θ2, θ˜
0
3) = a31,
b˜2(θ1, θ˜
0
2 , θ˜
0
3) = a21, b˜3(θ1, θ˜
0
2, θ˜
0
3) = a32.
Let εi = ε0 for all i. Then, for any ε0 > 0 and for i = 1, 2, 3, the difference between
the average fitnesses of θ˜0i and θi is
Πθ˜0
i
(µ˜ε; b˜)−Πθi(µ˜
ε; b˜) = ε0 + 6ε
2
0 > 0,
and hence the strategy profile (a11, a21, a31) is not stable.
We state this three-player case formally in the next proposition.
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Proposition 3.14. Let G be a three-player game, and let p be equal to 1. A strategy
profile σ∗ ∈
∏3
i=1∆(Ai) in G is not stable if there exist σ̂−3 ∈ ∆(A1) × ∆(A2),
σ̂−2 ∈ ∆(A1) ×∆(A3), σ̂−1 ∈ ∆(A2) ×∆(A3), and σ˜ ∈
∏3
i=1∆(Ai) such that for
each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and for distinct j, k ∈ {1, 2, 3} \ {i},
(a) minaj∈Aj πi(aj , σ̂−j) + minak∈Ak πi(ak, σ̂−k) ≥ 2πi(σ
∗),
(b) the equality in (a) implies that πi(σ˜) ≥ maxai∈Ai πi(ai, σ̂−i),
and there exists i ∈ {1, 2, 3} for which at least one of the inequalities in (a) and (b)
is strict.
Propositions 3.12 and 3.14 reveal that under perfect observability, a strategy
profile is stable only if there exist no correlated deviations such that regardless of
how the incumbents behave, the average fitness achievable for every mutant is at
least as high as the average fitnesses of the corresponding incumbents with at least
one strict inequality.
Notation. Since the focal set in Definition 3.2 is actually independent of the pop-
ulation shares of mutants, we can define a weaker stability criterion by taking an
invasion barrier against a given focal equilibrium, rather than a uniform invasion
barrier against all focal equilibria. Under this weaker criterion, we can obtain a
very succinct sufficient condition for stability in every n-player game: if a strictly
strong Nash equilibrium weakly Pareto dominates all strategy profiles in an n-player
game, then it is stable. 23
4. No Observability
In this section we study the features of the case where the degree of observability
is equal to zero. We assume that each player is ignorant of the preferences of his
opponents, but knows his own type and the joint distribution over the opponents’
types. The interactions among players can then be studied as an n-player Bayesian
game.
Suppose we are given a probability distribution µ ∈M(Θn). A strategy of each
player i under no observability is a function si : suppµi → ∆(Ai). The vector-
valued function s : suppµ→
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) defined by s(θ) = (s1(θ1), . . . , sn(θn)) is
a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of the subjective game Γ0(µ) if for each i ∈ N and
each θi ∈ suppµi,
si(θi) ∈ argmax
σi∈∆(Ai)
∑
θ′
−i
∈suppµ−i
µ−i(θ
′
−i)θi
(
σi, s−i(θ
′
−i)
)
,
where we write s−i(θ
′
−i) for s(θi, θ
′
−i)−i. Let B0(µ) denote the set of all Bayesian–
Nash equilibria of Γ0(µ). We call the pair (µ, s) of µ ∈ M(Θ
n) and s ∈ B0(µ) a
configuration. Here the aggregate outcome of (µ, s), defined as a correlated strategy,
can be written in the following form:
ϕµ,s(a1, . . . , an) =
∑
θ∈suppµ
∏
i∈N
µi(θi)si(θi)(ai) =
∏
i∈N
∑
θi∈suppµi
µi(θi)si(θi)(ai)
for every (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A. Indeed, it can be induced by the mixed-strategy profile
x(µ, s) =
( ∑
θ1∈suppµ1
µ1(θ1)s1(θ1), . . . ,
∑
θn∈suppµn
µn(θn)sn(θn)
)
.
23A strategy profile x is a strictly strong Nash equilibrium if for any J ⊆ N and for any
σJ ∈
∏
j∈J ∆(Aj) with σJ 6= xJ , there exists some k ∈ J such that pik(x) > pik(σJ , x−J). In
addition, we say that a strategy profile σ weakly Pareto dominates σ′ if pii(σ) ≥ pii(σ
′) for all
i ∈ N .
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Therefore, under no observability, we also refer to the mixed-strategy profile x(µ, s)
as the aggregate outcome of (µ, s).
For i ∈ N , the average fitness of a type θi ∈ suppµi with respect to (µ, s) can
be simply represented in terms of the aggregate outcome x(µ, s):
Πθi(µ; s) =
∑
θ′
−i
∈suppµ−i
µ−i(θ
′
−i)πi
(
s(θi, θ
′
−i)
)
= πi
(
si(θi), x(µ, s)−i
)
.
As in the perfectly observable case, a balanced configuration (µ, s) is defined by the
equality Πθi(µ; s) = Πθ′i(µ; s) holds for every i ∈ N and every θi, θ
′
i ∈ suppµi. In a
balanced configuration with no observability, the average fitness of any type in each
population is equal to the fitness value of the aggregate outcome under the corre-
sponding material payoff function. This is analogous to the result in Theorem 3.9,
without resorting to the stability condition.
Lemma 4.1. Let (µ, s) be a balanced configuration in (G,Γ0(µ)) with the aggregate
outcome x. Then
Πθi(µ; s) = πi(x)
for every i ∈ N and every θi ∈ suppµi.
Proof. Since (µ, s) is a balanced configuration, we have that for each i ∈ N and for
any fixed θi ∈ suppµi,
πi
(
si(θi), x−i
)
= Πθi(µ; s) = Πθ′i(µ; s) = πi
(
si(θ
′
i), x−i
)
for every θ′i ∈ suppµi. This implies that
πi(x) =
∑
θ′
i
∈suppµi
µi(θ
′
i)πi
(
si(θ
′
i), x−i
)
= πi
(
si(θi), x−i
)
= Πθi(µ; s),
and the proof is complete. 
When preferences are unobservable, a focal equilibrium should be defined such
that all incumbents’ behavior remains unchanged after an entry. However, unlike
the case of perfect observability, a focal equilibrium may not always exist, since the
incumbents may not be able to ignore the minor perturbation in the distribution of
preferences. For this reason, we consider nearby equilibria which can be chosen ar-
bitrarily close to the original one if the population shares of mutants are sufficiently
small.
Definition 4.2. Suppose that (µ, s) is a configuration with no observability. Let
µ˜ε be a post-entry distribution, and let η ≥ 0 be given. In Γ0(µ˜
ε), an equilibrium
s˜ ∈ B0(µ˜
ε) is called a nearby equilibrium relative to s within η if d(s˜(θ), s(θ)) ≤ η
for all θ ∈ suppµ, where d(s˜(θ), s(θ)) = maxi∈N d
∗(s˜i(θi), si(θi)) with d
∗ denoting
the Euclidean metric. Let Bη0 (µ˜
ε; s) be the subset of B0(µ˜
ε) consisting of all nearby
equilibria relative to s within η, called a nearby set.
By definition, a nearby equilibrium s˜ at zero distance from s is just a focal
equilibrium relative to s, which is defined by s˜(θ) = s(θ) for all θ ∈ suppµ. Thus,
the nearby set with η = 0 is the focal set, and will be denoted by B0(µ˜
ε; s). In
addition, the relation Bη10 (µ˜
ε; s) ⊆ Bη20 (µ˜
ε; s) holds whenever 0 ≤ η1 < η2.
The stability criterion under incomplete information is defined in the same way
as in Definition 3.3, except that the focal set is replaced by a nearby set. But
what types of nearby sets are relevant if the focal set is empty? In this case,
the criterion should require that as long as mutants are rare enough, (1) there
exist nearby equilibria arbitrarily close to the pre-entry one; (2) there always exists
a suitable nearby set such that all incumbents will not be driven out whenever
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the adopted equilibrium belongs to this set. It is worth noting that the way of
describing a suitable nearby set as presented below is precise but very simplified.
We will compare it with another nearby set which needs to be considered in DEY;
see Remark 4.3.1 and Example 4.4.
Definition 4.3. In (G,Γ0(µ)), a configuration (µ, s) is stable if it is balanced, and
if for any nonempty J ⊆ N , any θ˜J ∈
∏
j∈J (suppµj)
c
, and any η > 0, there exist
η¯ ∈ [0, η) and ǫ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every ε ∈ (0, 1)|J| with ‖ε‖ ∈ (0, ǫ¯), the nearby
set Bη¯0 (µ˜
ε; s) is nonempty and either (i) or (ii) is satisfied for all s˜ ∈ Bη¯0 (µ˜
ε; s).
(i) Πθj(µ˜
ε; s˜) > Πθ˜j (µ˜
ε; s˜) for some j ∈ J and for every θj ∈ suppµj .
(ii) Πθi(µ˜
ε; s˜) = Πθ̂i(µ˜
ε; s˜) for every i ∈ N and for every θi, θ̂i ∈ supp µ˜
ε
i .
A strategy profile σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is said to be stable if there exists a stable
configuration (µ, s) such that σ = x(µ, s).
This definition enables us to decide which nearby set is most appropriate, even
though there may be more equilibria satisfying the requirement of a given η. After
introduction of a mutant sub-profile θ˜J , if the focal set B0(µ˜
ε; s) is nonempty for
every sufficiently small ε, then the post-entry equilibria that we must consider are
those focal equilibria. The stability of (µ, s) ensures that the post-entry aggregate
outcomes get arbitrarily close to the original one as in Remark 3.2.1; formally, for
any ξ > 0, there exist η¯ > 0 and ǫ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every ε with ‖ε‖ ∈ (0, ǫ¯),
the relation d(x(µ˜ε, s˜), x(µ, s)) < ξ holds for all s˜ ∈ Bη¯0 (µ˜
ε; s).
Remark 4.3.1. If there are no focal equilibria, the definition of stability in DEY
requires that for any η > 0 and for any sufficiently small ε, the entrants do not
outperform the incumbents for every nearby equilibrium of Bη0 (µ˜
ε; s). However,
the nearby set Bη0 (µ˜
ε; s) for the given η may contain equilibria which are far from
s, no matter how small ε is. The equilibria which are not close enough to s may
lead to diverging conclusions regarding the stability, contrary to the original intent
of DEY; see Example 4.4. It is worth stressing that, unlike in DEY, we can avoid
choosing such equilibria by creating an adequate barrier η¯ for any given η. Based
on this observation, it is reasonable to say that the choice of a suitable nearby set
in this paper is more relevant for the case of no observability.
Example 4.4. Let (G,Γ0(µ)) be a pre-environment under incomplete information,
in which G is a two-player game with Ai = {ai1, ai2, ai3}, and the i-th population
consists of only one preference type θi. Suppose that
θ1(a) = θ2(a) =

2 if a = (a11, a21) or (a12, a22),
1 if a = (a11, a22) or (a12, a21),
0 otherwise.
Let s(θ1, θ2) = ((0.5, 0.5, 0), (0.5, 0.5, 0)); then s is a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of
Γ0(µ). We claim that under the stability criterion in Definition 4.3, the configu-
ration (µ, s) is stable provided that the objective game G can be represented as
follows.
a21 a22 a23
a11 2, 2 1, 1 0, 2
a12 1, 1 2, 2 0, 0
a13 2, 0 0, 0 1, 1
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To see why, we introduce a mutant type θ˜i entering the i-th population with a
population share εi ∈ (0, 1) for i = 1, 2, and let s˜ ∈ B0(µ˜
ε) be the chosen post-entry
equilibrium with s˜i(θi) = (pi1, pi2, 1−pi1−pi2) and s˜i(θ˜i) = (qi1, qi2, 1−qi1−qi2) for
each i. Assume that s˜ is a nearby equilibrium relative to s so that p11, p12, p21, p22 6=
0, which means that for every i, the following relation holds:
θi(ai1, x˜−i) = θi(ai2, x˜−i) ≥ θi(ai3, x˜−i),
where the j-th component of x˜ is (1−εj)s˜j(θj)+εj s˜j(θ˜j) for j 6= i. This would imply
that for i = 1, 2, we have pi1 =
1−εi(1+qi1−qi2)
2(1−εi)
, pi2 =
1−εi(1−qi1+qi2)
2(1−εi)
, and of course
1−pi1−pi2 = 0, which are well defined if εi < 1/2. Applying Kakutani’s fixed point
theorem to the mutants’ best response correspondences, such a nearby equilibrium
can be found, and it ensures that there exist post-entry equilibria arbitrarily close
to s as ‖ε‖ tends to 0. For each i and for j 6= i, it can be deduced that
πi(ai1, x˜−i) = πi(ai2, x˜−i) =
3
2
[1− εj(1− qj1 − qj2)] > πi(ai3, x˜−i) = 1
whenever εj < 1/3. Thus, entrants receive no higher average fitnesses than the
incumbents for all nearby equilibria of Bη¯0 (µ˜
ε; s) if η¯ and ε are sufficiently small,
which proves the claim.
It must be noted that another stability criterion derived from DEY can lead to
a different conclusion. Consider the pair (θ˜1, θ˜2) of mutant types, each of which
satisfies: θ˜i(a) equals 1 if a = (a11, a21), (a11, a23), (a13, a21), (a13, a23), equals 8 if
a = (a12, a22), and equals 0 otherwise. In this case, it is not difficult to check that
the focal set B0(µ˜
ε; s) is empty whenever ‖ε‖ < 7/9. Now let s˜′ be the strategy pair
defined by s˜′1(θ1) = s˜
′
2(θ2) = (1, 0, 0) and s˜
′
1(θ˜1) = s˜
′
2(θ˜2) = (0.3, 0, 0.7). Then s˜
′ is
also a Bayesian–Nash equilibrium of Γ0(µ˜
ε), no matter what ε may be. So if η, as
described in Remark 4.3.1, is too large, the nearby set Bη0 (µ˜
ε; s) would contain s˜′ for
every ε, and hence the “nearby” equilibrium s˜′ should be used to check whether or
not the configuration (µ, s) is stable in the sense of DEY. However, for an arbitrary
population share vector ε, the inequality Πθ˜i(µ˜
ε; s˜′) > Πθi(µ˜
ε; s˜′) holds for i = 1, 2.
This means that the configuration (µ, s) is not stable according to the stability
definition proposed by DEY. 24
The previous example demonstrates that as we let the population shares of the
mutants continue to decline, even if there are nearby equilibria arbitrarily close
to the original, another equilibrium far from the original will always exist at the
same time. For consistency with the concept of a focal equilibrium, it is natural to
assume that incumbents will adopt strategies that are as close as possible to the
original; equilibria relatively far from the original should not be considered. To
achieve this, we construct the barrier η¯ that can be adjusted accordingly to exclude
such equilibria from the given “nearby” sets; it is a key factor leading to a different
conclusion.
In the case of no observability, we first show that a stable aggregate outcome
must be a Nash equilibrium of the objective game. The intuition for this is sim-
ple. Suppose that the aggregate outcome of a balanced configuration is not a Nash
equilibrium. Then entrants can gain a fitness advantage by adopting another strat-
egy, under the assumption that the incumbents’ post-entry strategies are nearly
unchanged. Obviously, the converse of the “stable only if Nash” result is not true.
It is easy to construct examples showing that not every Nash equilibrium can be
supported by a stable configuration.
24Clearly, this discussion is entirely applicable to the single-population setting in DEY.
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Theorem 4.5. If a configuration (µ, s) is stable in (G,Γ0(µ)), then the aggregate
outcome of (µ, s) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Proof. Let x be the aggregate outcome of a stable configuration (µ, s), and suppose
that x is not a Nash equilibrium. Then there exist k ∈ N and ak ∈ Ak such that
πk(ak, x−k) > πk(x). We have seen in the proof of Lemma 4.1 that a balanced
configuration implies that πi(x) = πi
(
si(θi), x−i
)
for all i ∈ N and all θi ∈ suppµi,
and thus we obtain
(4.1) πk(ak, x−k) > πk
(
sk(θk), x−k
)
for all θk ∈ suppµk. Consider the mutant type θ˜k ∈ (suppµk)
c
appearing in the
k-th population, for which ak is the strictly dominant strategy. Then for any post-
entry equilibrium s˜, we get s˜k(θ˜k) = ak, and the average fitnesses of θ˜k and any
θk ∈ suppµk are, respectively,
Πθ˜k(µ˜
ε; s˜) = πk(ak, x˜−k) and Πθk(µ˜
ε; s˜) = πk
(
s˜k(θk), x˜−k
)
,
where x˜ = x(µ˜ε, s˜). Since πk is continuous on
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) and (4.1) holds for all
θk ∈ suppµk, the hypothesis that (µ, s) is stable implies that if η¯ and the population
share ε of θ˜k are small enough, the inequality
πk(ak, x˜−k) > πk
(
s˜k(θk), x˜−k
)
holds for all s˜ ∈ Bη¯0 (µ˜
ε; s) and all θk ∈ suppµk (see the discussion after Defini-
tion 4.3). Thus we have arrived at a contradiction. 
It is no doubt true that under incomplete information, there are no other pref-
erence types receiving higher average fitnesses than the players with materialist
preferences. 25 Therefore, a Nash equilibrium of the objective game would be
supported by a stable configuration, provided that the post-entry strategies of the
materialist players can be chosen arbitrarily close to the pre-entry ones, yielding
the Nash equilibrium. We will see that such condition is certainly satisfied if the
equilibrium is a strict Nash equilibrium or a completely mixed Nash equilibrium or
the unique Nash equilibrium of the objective game.
Proposition 4.6. Let (µ, s) be a configuration in (G,Γ0(µ)), and for every i ∈ N ,
let suppµi consist of several types congruent to the fitness function πi. Suppose that
for any θ˜J ∈
∏
j∈J (suppµj)
c
and any η > 0, the nearby set Bη0 (µ˜
ε; s) is nonempty
for all sufficiently small ε ∈ (0, 1)|J|. Then (µ, s) is stable.
Proof. For each s˜ ∈ Bη0 (µ˜
ε; s) and for each incumbent θi in the i-th population, we
obtain
s˜i(θi) ∈ argmax
σi∈∆(Ai)
∑
θ̂−i∈supp µ˜ε−i
µ˜ε−i(θ̂−i)πi
(
σi, s˜−i(θ̂−i)
)
,
since the preference type θi can be written as aπi + b for some a, b ∈ R with
a > 0. From this it clearly follows that Πθi(µ˜
ε; s˜) = Πθ′
i
(µ˜ε; s˜) for every i ∈ N and
every θi, θ
′
i ∈ suppµi, and that Πθj (µ˜
ε; s˜) ≥ Πθ˜j (µ˜
ε; s˜) for every j ∈ J and every
θj ∈ suppµj . 
Theorem 4.7. Under incomplete information, a strategy profile σ is stable if it is
one of the following equilibria of G:
25Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) introduce a general evolutionary model with no observability.
They find that if the subgroups are relatively small (and the effective matching uncertainty is
therefore large), materialist preferences are stable in a vast set of environments. For the issue
of preference evolution with unobservable preferences, see also Ely and Yilankaya (2001) and
Gu¨th and Peleg (2001).
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(1) a strict Nash equilibrium;
(2) a completely mixed Nash equilibrium;
(3) the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof. In each case, we suppose that the strategy profile σ is supported by a
monomorphic configuration (µ, s) with materialist preferences. We will show that
after mutants enter, every nearby set is nonempty if mutants’ population shares are
small enough. Then by Proposition 4.6, we can conclude that the Nash equilibrium
σ is stable.
First, let σ = (a∗1, . . . , a
∗
n) ∈
∏
i∈N Ai be a strict Nash equilibrium of G. Then
for a materialist incumbent θi in each i-th population, the inequality θi(a
∗) >
θi(ai, a
∗
−i) holds for all ai 6= a
∗
i . By continuity of θi, there exists a neighborhood
U of a∗−i in
∏
j 6=i∆(Aj) such that θi(a
∗
i , q−i) > θi(ai, q−i) for all ai 6= a
∗
i and all
q−i ∈ U . Therefore, after an entry, the focal equilibrium exists if the population
shares of mutants are sufficiently small regardless of mutants’ strategies.
For the second, let σ be a completely mixed Nash equilibrium of G. Then we get
θi(a
1
i , σ−i) = · · · = θi(a
ki
i , σ−i) for an incumbent θi in each i-th population, where
a1i , . . . , a
ki
i are all pure strategies available to player i. We claim that after a mutant
sub-profile θ˜J enters with its population share vector ε, the equilibrium s˜ ∈ B0(µ˜
ε)
can be chosen such that the incumbents’ post-entry strategy profile s˜(θ) tends to
σ if ‖ε‖ tends to 0. To prove this, let s˜j(θj) = xj and s˜j(θ˜j) = x˜j if j ∈ J , and
s˜j(θj) = σj otherwise. Suppose that each xj is also a completely mixed strategy,
so that in every i-th population, we have θi(a
1
i , x̂−i) = · · · = θi(a
ki
i , x̂−i) where the
j-th component of x̂ is (1 − εj)xj + εjx˜j if j ∈ J and it is σj otherwise. Then
for j ∈ J , the incumbent’s strategy xj can be chosen as xj(a
l
j) =
σj(a
l
j)−εj x˜j(a
l
j)
1−εj
for l = 1, . . . , kj , and so xj tends to σj as εj tends to 0, where xj is well defined
if εj < min{ σj(a
l
j), 1 − σj(a
l
j) | l = 1, . . . , kj }. Therefore, applying Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem to the mutants’ best response correspondences, such a nearby
equilibrium does exist.
Finally, suppose that the objective game G has a unique Nash equilibrium σ.
Let θ˜J be an arbitrary mutant sub-profile with its population share vector ε, which
induces a sequence {s˜t} of post-entry equilibria obtained by reducing the norm ‖ε‖
to 0. For the sequence {s˜t(θ)} where θ ∈ suppµ, since
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is a compact
subset of a Euclidean space, there exists a subsequence {s˜tk(θ)} converging to some
σ¯ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai). Note that for each i ∈ N and each xi ∈ ∆(Ai),
θi
(
s˜tki (θi), x̂
tk
−i
)
≥ θi(xi, x̂
tk
−i)
where the j-th component of x̂tk is (1− εtkj )s˜
tk
j (θj) + ε
tk
j s˜
tk
j (θ˜j); here ε
tk
j converges
to 0 if j ∈ J and equals 0 otherwise. Since θi is a continuous function representing
the materialist preferences in every i-th population, the strategy profile σ¯ is also
a Nash equilibrium of G, and thus σ¯ = σ. This means that after an entry, every
nearby set is nonempty if mutants’ population shares are small enough. 
When preferences are not observed, there appears to be a close relationship
between evolution of preferences and standard evolutionary game theoretic mod-
els. 26 If an individual cannot adjust his strategy according to specific opponents,
there seems no advantage in having preferences different from the material payoff
function. Even so, the indirect evolutionary approach with incomplete information
26Robson and Samuelson (2011, p. 234) conclude that “The indirect evolutionary approach
with unobservable preferences then gives us an alternative description of the evolutionary process,
one that is perhaps less reminiscent of biological determinism, but leads to no new results.”
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yields another refinement of the Nash equilibrium concept. In Example 4.4, we
show that the equilibrium ((0.5, 0.5, 0), (0.5, 0.5, 0)) is a stable aggregate outcome;
however, the equilibrium strategy (0.5, 0.5, 0) is not a neutrally stable strategy be-
cause it can be displaced by (1, 0, 0). Compared to pre-programmed strategies,
that incumbents adjust their strategies according to their beliefs would prevent
them from being eliminated. Interestingly, such minor adjustments may lead to
mutual benefits for both participants. A novelty in Theorem 4.7 is that the mate-
rialist preferences supporting a completely mixed Nash equilibrium would coexist
with any new entrants, even though the completely mixed equilibrium consists of
evolutionarily stable strategies.
5. Partial Observability
In this section, we assume that each player observes the opponents’ types with
some fixed probability p ∈ (0, 1), and knows his own type and the joint distribu-
tion over the opponents’ types with the remaining probability 1 − p. The degree
of observability p is common knowledge. The two realizations are independently
distributed among the players, and these statuses are private information.
For a probability distribution µ ∈ M(Θn) and each i ∈ N , let bpi : suppµ →
∆(Ai) and s
p
i : suppµi → ∆(Ai) be two strategy functions of player i. We can
then define two vector-valued functions bp, sp : suppµ →
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) by b
p(θ) =(
bp1(θ), . . . , b
p
n(θ)
)
and sp(θ) =
(
sp1(θ1), . . . , s
p
n(θn)
)
. For a matched n-tuple of play-
ers θ ∈ suppµ, the notations bpi (θ) and s
p
i (θi) denote the strategies of θi against the
opponents θ−i under perfect observability and no observability, respectively. Let
T = { j ∈ N | θj is a player in θ and θj is ignorant of the opponents’ types }.
Then the strategy profile adopted by this matched n-tuple θ is
(
sp(θ)T , b
p(θ)−T
)
.
The pair of strategy functions (bp, sp) is an equilibrium in the subjective game
Γp(µ) if for each matched n-tuple θ ∈ suppµ and each i ∈ N , the strategies b
p
i (θ)
and spi (θi) satisfy the following two properties. First, when θi can observe the
(n− 1)-tuple θ−i of the opponents’ types,
bpi (θi, θ−i) ∈ argmax
σi∈∆(Ai)
∑
T⊆N\{i}
pn−1−|T |(1−p)|T |θi
(
σi, (s
p
−i(θ−i)T , b
p
−i(θi, θ−i)−T )
)
.27
Second, when θi cannot observe the opponents’ types,
spi (θi) ∈ argmax
σi∈∆(Ai)
∑
θ′
−i
∈suppµ−i
(
µ−i(θ
′
−i)
×
∑
T⊆N\{i}
pn−1−|T |(1− p)|T |θi
(
σi, (s
p
−i(θ
′
−i)T , b
p
−i(θi, θ
′
−i)−T )
))
.
The set of all such equilibrium pairs in Γp(µ) is denoted by Bp(µ). For µ ∈ M(Θ
n)
and (bp, sp) ∈ Bp(µ), we call the triple (µ, b
p, sp) a configuration. In this partially
observable environment, the aggregate outcome of (µ, bp, sp) refers to the probability
distribution ϕµ,bp,sp over A, which is defined by
ϕµ,bp,sp(a1, . . . , an) =
∑
θ∈suppµ
µ(θ)
∑
T⊆N
pn−|T |(1− p)|T |
∏
i∈N
(sp(θ)T , b
p(θ)−T )i(ai).
A strategy profile σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is called an aggregate outcome if the induced
correlated strategy ϕσ is the aggregate outcome of some configuration. For i ∈ N ,
27Here we note that the empty set is a subset of any set; the number of the empty set is zero.
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the average fitness of a type θi ∈ suppµi with respect to (µ, b
p, sp) is
Πθi(µ; b
p, sp) =
∑
θ′
−i
∈suppµ−i
µ−i(θ
′
−i)
∑
T⊆N
pn−|T |(1−p)|T |πi
(
sp(θi, θ
′
−i)T , b
p(θi, θ
′
−i)−T
)
.
As before, a configuration (µ, bp, sp) is said to be balanced if for every i ∈ N , the
equality Πθi(µ; b
p, sp) = Πθ′
i
(µ; bp, sp) holds for every θi, θ
′
i ∈ suppµi.
Next we extend the definitions of a nearby set and of stability in an obvious
method to include the case of partial observability. For notational simplicity, we
shall write (b, s) for (bp, sp).
Definition 5.1. Let (µ, b, s) be a configuration with p ∈ (0, 1), and let µ˜ε be a
post-entry distribution. In Γp(µ˜
ε), the nearby set Bηp (µ˜
ε; b, s) for a given η ≥ 0 is
defined by
Bηp (µ˜
ε; b, s) = { (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bp(µ˜
ε) | max{d(˜b(θ), b(θ)), d(s˜(θ), s(θ))} ≤ η for all θ ∈ suppµ }.
A pair (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bηp (µ˜
ε; b, s) is called a nearby equilibrium pair relative to (b, s) within
η. If η = 0, we simply denote the nearby set by Bp(µ˜
ε; b, s), call it a focal set, and
call its elements focal equilibrium pairs relative to (b, s).
The stability concept of a configuration in the intermediate case is consistent
with those used in the two extreme cases.
Definition 5.2. In (G,Γp(µ)) with p ∈ (0, 1), a configuration (µ, b, s) is stable if
it is balanced, and if for any nonempty J ⊆ N , any θ˜J ∈
∏
j∈J (suppµj)
c
, and any
η > 0, there exist η¯ ∈ [0, η) and ǫ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that for every ε ∈ (0, 1)|J| with
‖ε‖ ∈ (0, ǫ¯), the nearby set Bη¯p (µ˜
ε; b, s) is nonempty and either (i) or (ii) is satisfied
for all (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bη¯p (µ˜
ε; b, s).
(i) Πθj(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) > Πθ˜j(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) for some j ∈ J and for every θj ∈ suppµj .
(ii) Πθi(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) = Πθ̂i(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) for every i ∈ N and for every θi, θ̂i ∈ supp µ˜
ε
i .
A strategy profile σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) is said to be stable if it is the aggregate outcome
of some stable configuration.
It is important to note that the equilibria, the average fitnesses, and the stability
criteria defined in the cases where p = 1 and p = 0 can be regarded as the limiting
cases of those defined in the intermediate setting as p→ 1 and p→ 0, respectively.
It allows us to check whether the preceding results in Section 3 and Section 4 remain
valid if the two degrees p = 1 and p = 0 are perturbed, respectively. As in DEY,
when considering the case of partial observability, we restrict attention to aggregate
outcomes which can be interpreted as degenerate distributions, called pure-strategy
outcomes.
In the single-population model of DEY, they show that for pure-strategy out-
comes, the necessity result under perfect observability is robust. We begin by pro-
viding a counterexample to show that Pareto efficiency is not a necessary condition
for stability whenever p is less than 1, regardless of how close p is to 1. This says
that Theorem 3.6 will not hold without perfect observability. The reason for this
difference is that, unlike efficiency defined for the single-population model, mov-
ing from a Pareto-dominated outcome may not make everyone strictly better off.
Therefore, in our model, a Pareto improvement with partial observability would no
longer necessarily represent a chance for a mutant sub-profile to make some mutant
type receive a higher average fitness without any expense to it; the effect of no
observability on the average fitness may not be ignored as long as observability is
not perfect.
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Example 5.3. Let the objective game G be the following asymmetric two-player
game, and suppose that the degree of observability p ∈ (0, 1).
a21 a22
a11 5, 5 5, 0
a12 0, 5 5, 10
By Theorem 3.6, the strategy profile (a11, a21) is not stable for p = 1; by Theo-
rem 4.7, it is stable for p = 0. We claim that this strategy profile (a11, a21) is also
stable for any p ∈ (0, 1). To see this, suppose that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the i-th pop-
ulation consists of types for which ai1 is the strictly dominant strategy, and denote
this configuration by (µ, b, s). Then we have b(θ) = (a11, a21) and s(θ) = (a11, a21)
for all θ ∈ suppµ, and thus the aggregate outcome of (µ, b, s) is (a11, a21). Let an
indifferent mutant sub-profile θ˜0J with ε ∈ (0, 1)
|J| be introduced to check the stabil-
ity. Obviously, any post-entry equilibrium must be a focal equilibrium pair relative
to (b, s), that is, Bp(µ˜
ε) = Bp(µ˜
ε; b, s) for any p ∈ (0, 1) and any ε ∈ (0, 1)|J|.
In the case where |J | = 1, it is clear that mutants have no fitness advantage.
Now let J = {1, 2}, and let (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bp(µ˜
ε; b, s). Then the equalities
Πθ1(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) = 5 and Πθ2(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) = 5
always hold. On the other hand, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the average fitness of θ˜0i is
Πθ˜0
i
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) = (1− ε−i)
(
pπi
(
b˜i(θ˜
0
i , θ−i), a−i1
)
+ (1− p)πi
(
s˜i(θ˜
0
i ), a−i1
))
+ ε−i
[
p2πi
(
b˜(θ˜0)
)
+ p(1− p)πi
(˜
bi(θ˜
0), s˜−i(θ˜
0
−i)
)
+ (1 − p)pπi
(
s˜i(θ˜
0
i ), b˜−i(θ˜
0)
)
+ (1− p)2πi
(
s˜(θ˜0)
)]
,
where a−i1 denotes the pure strategy aj1 with j 6= i. There are three cases to
consider for strategies of the indifferent mutants.
Case 1: s˜(θ˜0) = (a11, a21). If b˜(θ˜
0) = (a11, a21), then mutants’ average fitnesses
are all equal to 5. If b˜1(θ˜
0) = a11 and b˜2(θ˜
0) 6= a21, then Πθ˜0
2
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) < 5 for all
p ∈ (0, 1) and all ε ∈ (0, 1)2. If b˜1(θ˜
0) 6= a11, then Πθ˜0
1
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) < 5 for all p ∈ (0, 1)
and all ε ∈ (0, 1)2.
Case 2: s˜1(θ˜
0
1) = a11 and s˜2(θ˜
0
2) 6= a21. If b˜1(θ˜
0) = a11, we obtain Πθ˜0
2
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) < 5
for all p ∈ (0, 1) and all ε ∈ (0, 1)2. If b˜1(θ˜
0) 6= a11 and b˜2(θ˜
0) 6= a22, we have
Πθ˜0
1
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) < 5 for all p ∈ (0, 1) and all ε ∈ (0, 1)2. If b˜1(θ˜
0) 6= a11, b˜2(θ˜
0) = a22,
and s˜2(θ˜
0
2) 6= a22, then we again have Πθ˜0
1
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) < 5 for all p ∈ (0, 1) and all ε ∈
(0, 1)2. Finally, suppose that b˜1(θ˜
0) 6= a11, b˜2(θ˜
0) = a22, and s˜2(θ˜
0
2) = a22. Then the
average fitness of θ˜02 satisfies Πθ˜0
2
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) ≤ 5p+5pε1. Let ǫ¯ = min{1,
1−p
p }. Then,
for each p ∈ (0, 1), we get Πθ˜0
2
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) < 5 for each ε ∈ (0, 1)2 with ‖ε‖ ∈ (0, ǫ¯).
Case 3: s˜1(θ˜
0
1) 6= a11. Obviously the inequality Πθ˜0
1
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) < 5 holds for all
p ∈ (0, 1) and all ε ∈ (0, 1)2.
The above discussion shows that the weakly Pareto-efficient strategy profile
(a11, a21) is stable for any p ∈ (0, 1), even though it is not Pareto efficient.
Instead of Pareto efficiency, we can show that weak Pareto efficiency is a neces-
sary condition for pure-strategy outcomes to be stable under almost perfect observ-
ability. If a pure-strategy profile is strongly Pareto dominated by another strategy
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profile, then this outcome will be unstable for large enough degrees of observability.
In such a case, entrants in every population can gain a fitness advantage over the
incumbents, as described in the proof of the following theorem. While the necessity
result under perfect observability is not robust, the analysis of this necessary con-
dition still reveals that materialist preferences may have no evolutionary advantage
even if preferences are are imperfectly observed.
Theorem 5.4. Let a∗ be a pure-strategy profile in G. If for any p¯ ∈ (0, 1) there
exists p ∈ (p¯, 1) such that a∗ is stable for the degree p, then it is weakly Pareto
efficient with respect to π.
Proof. Let p ∈ (0, 1) be a degree of observability, and suppose that a∗ is not weakly
Pareto efficient with respect to π. Let (µ, b, s) be a configuration with the aggregate
outcome a∗. Then b(θ) = a∗ and s(θ) = a∗ for all θ ∈ suppµ. To prove the theorem,
it suffices to show that there exists p¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that the configuration (µ, b, s) is
not stable for any p ∈ (p¯, 1). Because a∗ is not weakly Pareto efficient, there exists
σ ∈
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai) such that πi(σ) > πi(a
∗) for all i ∈ N . Consider an indifferent
mutant profile θ˜0 = (θ˜01 , . . . , θ˜
0
n) with its population share vector ε = (ε1, . . . , εn).
For (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bp(µ˜
ε), suppose that the mutants’ strategies satisfy (1) b˜(θ˜0) = σ and
s˜(θ˜0) = a∗; (2) for any nonempty proper subset T of N and any θ−T ∈ suppµ−T ,
the equality b˜j(θ˜
0
T , θ−T ) = a
∗
j holds for all j ∈ T . Then the focal set Bp(µ˜
ε; b, s)
would be nonempty for an arbitrary population share vector ε ∈ (0, 1)n.
Let (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bp(µ˜
ε; b, s) be chosen with b˜(θ˜0T , θ−T ) = a
∗ for any T  N and any
θ−T ∈ suppµ−T . Then, for each i ∈ N , the difference Πθ˜0
i
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) −Πθi(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜)
in average fitnesses between the mutant θ˜0i and the incumbent θi is
µ˜ε−i(θ˜
0
−i)
(
pn[πi(σ) − πi(a
∗)] +
∑
∅ 6=T⊆N
pn−|T |(1− p)|T |[πi(a
∗
T , σ−T )− πi(a
∗)]
)
.
Since πi(σ) > πi(a
∗) for all i ∈ N and the game G is finite, there exists p¯ ∈ (0, 1)
such that for any p ∈ (p¯, 1), the inequality Πθ˜0
i
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) > Πθi(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) holds for all
i ∈ N and all θi ∈ suppµi, regardless of the population shares of the mutants. 
Next we show that if a pure-strategy profile is not a Nash equilibrium of the
objective game, then it is not stable when preferences are almost unobservable.
This means that for the case of pure-strategy outcomes, the result of Theorem 4.5
is robust against small perturbations in the degrees of observability.
Theorem 5.5. Let a∗ be a pure-strategy profile in G. If for any p¯ ∈ (0, 1) there
exists p ∈ (0, p¯) such that a∗ is stable for the degree p, then it is a Nash equilibrium
of G.
Proof. Suppose that p ∈ (0, 1), and that a∗ is not a Nash equilibrium of G. Let
(µ, b, s) be a configuration with the aggregate outcome a∗. Then b(θ) = a∗ and
s(θ) = a∗ for all θ ∈ suppµ. To prove the theorem, it suffices to show that there
exists p¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that the configuration (µ, b, s) is not stable for any p ∈ (0, p¯).
Since a∗ is not a Nash equilibrium, there exists a strategy ak ∈ Ak for some k ∈ N
such that πk(ak, a
∗
−k) > πk(a
∗). Consider the mutant type θ˜k appearing in the
k-th population, for which ak is the strictly dominant strategy. For given p ∈ (0, 1)
and η > 0, we assume that the nearby set Bηp (µ˜
ε; b, s) is nonempty whenever the
population share ε of θ˜k is sufficiently small; otherwise (µ, b, s) is unstable for the
degree p.
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Let (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bηp (µ˜
ε; b, s). Then the post-entry average fitness of an individual θ̂k
in the k-th population is
Πθ̂k(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) = (1− p)n
∑
θ′
−k
∈suppµ−k
µ−k(θ
′
−k)πk
(
s˜(θ̂k, θ
′
−k)
)
+ p
∑
θ′
−k
∈suppµ−k
µ−k(θ
′
−k)
∑
T N
pn−1−|T |(1 − p)|T |πk
(
s˜(θ̂k, θ
′
−k)T , b˜(θ̂k, θ
′
−k)−T
)
,
where we note that there are no new entrants except the mutants in the k-th
population. Because πk(ak, a
∗
−k) > πk(a
∗) and πk is continuous on
∏
i∈N ∆(Ai),
there exist κ > 0 and η > 0 such that if (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bηp (µ˜
ε; b, s), then
πk
(
s˜(θ˜k, θ
′
−k)
)
− πk
(
s˜(θk, θ
′
−k)
)
= πk
(
ak, s˜−k(θ
′
−k)
)
− πk
(
s˜(θk, θ
′
−k)
)
≥ κ
for every θk ∈ suppµk and every θ
′
−k ∈ suppµ−k. Thus there exist p¯ ∈ (0, 1)
and η > 0 such that for any p ∈ (0, p¯) and any (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bηp (µ˜
ε; b, s), the inequality
Πθ˜k(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) > Πθk(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) holds for every θk ∈ suppµk. 
We now turn our attention to the robustness of the preceding results concerning
sufficient conditions for stability. The following theorem shows that the conclusion
of Theorem 3.10 still holds for every degree p ∈ (0, 1), and so, by Theorem 4.7, it
holds for all degrees of observability.
Theorem 5.6. Let G be a two-player game, and suppose that (a∗1, a
∗
2) is Pareto
efficient with respect to π. If (a∗1, a
∗
2) is a strict Nash equilibrium of G, then (a
∗
1, a
∗
2)
is stable for all p ∈ (0, 1).
Proof. Let (a∗1, a
∗
2) be a strict Nash equilibrium of G, and suppose that it is not
stable for some p ∈ (0, 1). We will show that (a∗1, a
∗
2) is not Pareto efficient with
respect to π. Assume that for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the i-th population consists of the only
type θi for which a
∗
i is the strictly dominant strategy, and denote this configuration
by (µ, b, s). Hence the focal set will be nonempty in any post-entry environment
after mutants enter. Our assumption implies that the aggregate outcome of (µ, b, s)
is (a∗1, a
∗
2), and so this configuration (µ, b, s) is unstable for the degree p. This means
that there exists some chance for a mutant sub-profile θ˜J to gain a fitness advantage
over the incumbents.
In the case where |J | = 1, it is obvious that no mutant can have an evolutionary
advantage since (a∗1, a
∗
2) is a strict Nash equilibrium. In the case where J = {1, 2},
it must be true that for every ǫ¯ ∈ (0, 1), there exist a population share vector ε ∈
(0, 1)2 with ‖ε‖ ∈ (0, ǫ¯) and a focal equilibrium pair (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bp(µ˜
ε; b, s) such that
Πθ˜i(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) ≥ Πθi(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) for every i ∈ {1, 2}, and Πθ˜k(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) > Πθk(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) for
some k ∈ {1, 2}. To complete the proof, we have to show that (a∗1, a
∗
2) is Pareto
dominated in any situation where the incumbents are driven out.
For (˜b, s˜) ∈ Bp(µ˜
ε; b, s) and i ∈ {1, 2}, define z˜i : supp µ˜
ε → ∆(Ai) by z˜i(θ̂1, θ̂2) =
pb˜i(θ̂1, θ̂2) + (1 − p)s˜i(θ̂i). Then the post-entry average fitness of θi ∈ suppµi is
Πθi(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) = (1− ε−i)πi(a
∗
1, a
∗
2) + ε−iπi
(
a∗i , z˜−i(θi, θ˜−i)
)
.
On the other hand, the post-entry average fitness of θ˜i ∈ (suppµj)
c
is
Πθ˜i(µ˜
ε; b˜, s˜) = (1 − ε−i)πi
(
z˜i(θ˜i, θ−i), a
∗
−i
)
+ ε−iπi
(
z˜1(θ˜1, θ˜2), z˜2(θ˜1, θ˜2)
)
.
With this kind of representation, the remaining part of the proof is exactly the
same as that in Theorem 3.10. 
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From Theorem 4.7, we know that when opponents’ preferences are unobservable,
a pure-strategy outcome can be stable if it is a strict Nash equilibrium or the
unique Nash equilibrium of the objective game. However, this result may not hold
in the case of partial observability. If the degree of observability is positive, even
arbitrarily small, then mutants may earn higher average fitnesses by adopting more
efficient strategies only when they see and meet one another without affecting the
incumbents’ expectations and strategies; see the following Example. It indicates
that efficiency would play a role in preference evolution as long as there is a positive
probability of observing preferences.
Example 5.7. Suppose that the objective game G is the following Prisoner’s
Dilemma game.
C2 D2
C1 2, 2 0, 3
D1 3, 0 1, 1
With respect to the payoffs of G, the strategy of defection is strictly dominant for
each player, and so (D1, D2) is the unique Nash equilibrium, also a strict Nash
equilibrium, of the game. However, we show that (D1, D2) can be destabilized if
preferences are not completely unobservable.
Let p ∈ (0, 1) and let (µ, b, s) be a configuration with the aggregate outcome
(D1, D2). Then b(θ) = (D1, D2) and s(θ) = (D1, D2) for all θ ∈ suppµ. Let an
indifferent mutant profile (θ˜01 , θ˜
0
2) be introduced with its population share vector ε =
(ε1, ε2). Suppose that the strategies of the mutants have the following properties:
(1) b˜(θ˜01 , θ˜
0
2) = (C1, C2) and s˜(θ˜
0
1 , θ˜
0
2) = (D1, D2); (2) b˜1(θ˜
0
1 , θ2) = D1 for all θ2 ∈
suppµ2 and b˜2(θ1, θ˜
0
2) = D2 for all θ1 ∈ suppµ1. This implies that the focal set
Bp(µ˜
ε; b, s) is nonempty no matter what the population share vector ε is. Choose
(˜b, s˜) ∈ Bp(µ˜
ε; b, s) with b˜1(θ1, θ˜
0
2) = D1 and b˜2(θ˜
0
1, θ2) = D2 for all incumbents θ1
and θ2. Then, for each i ∈ {1, 2}, the average fitness of θi ∈ suppµi is 1. On the
other hand, the average fitness of θ˜0i is
Πθ˜0
i
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) = (1 − ε−i) · 1 + ε−i
(
p2 · 2 + p(1− p)(0 + 3) + (1− p)2 · 1
)
.
Therefore, for each p ∈ (0, 1) and each i ∈ {1, 2}, we have Πθ˜0
i
(µ˜ε; b˜, s˜) > 1 regard-
less of the population shares of the mutants, and hence (D1, D2) is not stable for
any positive degree of observability.
6. Conclusion
While an asymmetric game is a more realistic representation of most contests,
it is virtually ignored in the literature on the evolution of preferences. In this
paper, we focus our attention on the multi-population model, where players can
distinguish their roles and may have different action sets. Our results reveal that
materialist preferences may have no evolutionary advantage even if preferences are
imperfectly observed. It turns out that there is a tendency towards some efficiency
unless preferences are completely unobservable.
Besides, our sufficiency result under perfect observability is very different from
any result in the evolutionary literature. It implies that the choice of the number
of populations at nature’s disposal is crucial in the evolution of preferences. We
show that a sufficient condition for two-population stability cannot guarantee the
existence of a stable outcome in a three-player game. Furthermore, the interactions
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among mutants exhibit how Pareto-efficient strong Nash equilibria are destroyed.
This suggests that a wide variety of combinations of mutants can make a huge
difference in stability results.
When preferences are unobservable, it is easy to see that materialist preferences
have obvious evolutionary advantages in our model. Intuitively, non-materialist
preferences will no longer have an effect as making a commitment if players can-
not distinguish among the types of opponents. But since the existence of nearby
equilibria is not guaranteed, it is not necessarily true that a materialist configura-
tion must be stable. For example, suppose that the fitness assignment is described
by the following asymmetric game, and that all populations consist of materialist
preferences.
a21 a22 a23
a11 1, 1 1, 0 0, 0
a12 1, 1 0, 0 1, 0
It is easy to verify that no matter what the equilibrium outcome is, the nearby
equilibria do not exist after suitable mutants are introduced to perturb the equi-
librium outcome. Thus, materialist preferences in such a case cannot form a stable
configuration. However, we claim that a stable outcome does exist in this objective
game. To prove this, let each i-th population consist of preferences for which ai1
is the strictly dominant strategy. Then a focal equilibrium exists for any entry,
and mutants in the second population adopting strategies distinct from a21 will be
driven out. Therefore, the strategy profile (a11, a21) is a stable aggregate outcome
supported by these non-materialist preferences.
Finally, note that the above asymmetric game has no strictly perfect equilibria,
which was introduced in Okada (1981). It should be emphasized that the indirect
evolutionary approach with incomplete information is a refinement of the Nash
equilibrium concept different not only from the notion of a neutrally stable strategy,
but also from the notion of a strictly perfect equilibrium.
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